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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS
Yu Wang
Holger Sieg

This dissertation consists of two essays. The common theme is Public Economics: to understand the effects of government policies in order to improve their design and to understand
how special interest groups affect the local fiscal policies.
In the first chapter, I study the impact of student debt on the education, career, and
marriage choices of female lawyers. Law students quite often take on substantial amounts
of debt to finance their graduate education. There has been much concern in the legal
profession and among policy-makers that this debt burden distorts career choices. The
empirical analysis is based on a novel, nationally representative, longitudinal dataset. In
contrast to the previous literature that has largely focused on males and finds only small
effects, these new data suggest that debt has large and significant negative effects on female
career and marriage outcomes. To explore the likely causes of these negative debt effects,
I develop and estimate a dynamic model of education, labor, and marriage markets. My
findings suggest that a large part of the debt effect on schooling and career choices comes
from the diminished marriage prospects associated with the debt burden. I then focus on
policies that aim to reduce the debt burden while also encouraging female lawyers to pursue
careers in the public sector. My policy experiments show that subsidizing student debt
repayment earlier in the career is more effective than doing so later.
In the second chapter, I study the impact of unions on municipal elections and urban
vi

fiscal policies. The efficient decentralized provision of public goods requires that special
interest groups, such as municipal unions, do not exercise undue influence on the outcome
of municipal elections and local fiscal policies. I have assembled a unique data set that is
based on union endorsements that are published in leading local newspapers. My empirical
analysis focuses on municipal elections in the 150 largest cities in the U.S. between 1990 and
2012. I find that challengers strongly benefit from endorsements in competitive elections.
Challengers that receive union endorsements and successfully defeat an incumbent also tend
to adopt more union friendly fiscal policies.
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Chapter 1

The Impact of Student Debt on the
Education, Career, and Marriage
Choices of Female Lawyers 1
1.1

Motivation

Obtaining a J.D. is one of the most expensive possible investments in human capital. As a
consequence, law students quite often take on substantial amounts of debt to finance their
graduate education. There has been much concern in the legal profession and among policy
makers that this debt burden distorts career choices. The purpose of this paper is to study
the impact of student debt on the education, career, and marriage choices of female lawyers.
The empirical analysis is based on a novel, nationally representative, longitudinal dataset.
1
The reviews and conclusions stated herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
views of individuals or organizations associated with the After the JD or the National Postsecondary Student
Aid Study.
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In contrast to the previous literature that has focused largely on males and finds only small
effects, these new data suggest that debt has large and significant negative effects on female
career and marriage outcomes. Specifically, women with more debt stay longer in private
sector jobs, postpone marriage, marry men with lower earnings, and delay childbearing.
These facts speak to a long-standing concern of the legal profession: does high student
debt impel law graduates to eschew public service jobs in favor of more lucrative positions in
private practices? The answer has important policy implications regarding the launch and
design of public service loan forgiveness programs. Much of the previous literature suggests
that the career choices of male lawyers are not related to student debt, and that the effects
of such policies are not pronounced. However, these policies may effectively increase public
service employment of females, who account for nearly half of a typical cohort.
Another part of the research question, namely how potential debt burden affects schooling choices, is particularly relevant in the legal profession. Law school costs rise substantially with school rankings and induce a palpable quality-price tradeoff for applicants. If
the debt burden affects female choices post-graduation, the top law schools may be even
more costly for females who resort to student debt in order to finance their education. This
paper analyzes the extent to which students of equal ability but different means may choose
lower-ranked, cheaper law schools in order to avoid the debt burden.
To address these questions, I develop a dynamic model of the education, labor, and
marriage markets. Students first need to choose among a set of differentiated law schools
to some of which they are admitted. Schools differ by costs and rankings. Upon graduation
all students enter the labor market which offers a number of occupational tracks such as
private law firms, private companies, and public sector jobs, in addition to the option to

2

stay at home. At the same time, female lawyers are active in marriage markets. Potential
marriages depend flexibly on one’s debt burden and individual characteristics.
Labor markets for lawyers have some special features that deserve attention. First, young
lawyers employed at private law firms often face an up-or-out decision regarding promotion
to partner. Promotion is highly uncertain. This system is similar to that of tenure in
academia. A key feature of the model is thus a learning process which allows young lawyers
to infer the likelihood of promotion based on their work experience. I show that a learning
model can explain the rapidly declining prevalence of private law firm jobs during the life
cycle as observed in the data. Second, this paper models differences in the required number
of hours of work in addition to differences in salaries among occupational tracks. This
approach is consistent with the fact that lawyers in private law firms tend to work longer
hours than those in the public sector or at private companies. Finally, this model accounts
for the importance of clerkships for young, aspiring lawyers who may delay entry into the
job market so as to gain additional training.
The objective of the structural analysis is to evaluate the importance of alternative
mechanisms that may explain why debt has such a large impact on female lawyers. In the
model, debt affects the lifetime budget constraint and thus primarily influences consumption
and labor supply choices over time. In addition, debt affects prospects in the marriage
market.
The key empirical finding of this paper is that differences in female career choices
are driven in large part by marriage market prospects. If one equalizes marriage market
prospects for females with and without debt, the differences in labor market choice shrink
substantially. The intuition is that females with large debt have fewer opportunities in
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the marriage market, and thereby experience poorer marriage outcomes. Consequently, it
takes them longer to meet a qualified spouse and to have children. The second finding is
that females significantly under-invest in education quality in anticipation of the diminished
marriage market prospects associated with their future debt burden.
Using the estimated parameters from the structural analysis, I finally turn to evaluating
loan repayment assistance programs. My main contribution here is to show the importance
of timing for such policies. The motivation is that females, on average, graduate at age
28 and, as discussed above, the debt effect through marriage prospects is large. In light of
this, the existing Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program offered by the Department of
Education, which requires ten years of public service for eligibility for loan forgiveness, offers
potential room for improvement. I compare a loan forgiveness policy similar to the Public
Service Loan Forgiveness Program to a career-contingent tuition waiver policy. The tuition
waiver policy conditionally discharges a fraction of debt immediately upon graduation, which
is repayable if a job in the public service is not held for a specified number of years. The
main finding is that it is much more effective to subsidize debt sooner rather than later.
My work builds on the literature studying how student debt affects career choices. Using
a sample consisting exclusively of male law students from University of Michigan, Sauer
(1998, 2004) finds that student debt has only a modest influence on career choices during
the first 15 years after graduation. I differ by focusing on career choices of female lawyers.
Field (2009) exploits a natural experiment including both male and female students at NYU’s
law school and finds that student debt strongly discourages public sector employment in the
first two years of a person’s career. Rothstein and Rouse (2011) reach similar conclusion
exploiting a natural experiment with a sample of undergraduate students. I complement
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these studies by examining female career choices over a longer and more important horizon
and by decomposing the underlying mechanisms.
The literature on the relationship between student debt and marriage choices is sparse.
Addo (2014), Bozick and Estacion (2014) and Gicheva (2014) document that the amount
of accumulated student debt is negatively related to the probability of first marriage using
nationally representative samples of National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97)
participants, bachelor’s degree recipients, and MBA students respectively. I complement
this literature by documenting differences in marriage quality in addition to differences
in marriage rates. Moreover, while these studies investigate the debt effect on observed
marriage outcomes, I am able to isolate the debt effect on marriage opportunities with the
aid of a structural model in which the timing of marriage is a choice.
There is a large literature studying how student debt policies affect schooling decisions.2
The main finding is that the relaxation of the borrowing limit in the schooling stage does
not significantly increase college enrollment. I differ by evaluating a different set of student
debt policies, namely, policies subsidizing repayments in the post-graduation stage. I also
measure choice of school quality – an under-studied outcome – rather than educational
attainment.
Overall, I contribute to the student debt literature by jointly analyzing the education,
labor, and marriage markets. By connecting these markets, I demonstrate that policy interventions in the labor market can be designed more effectively by accounting for the debt
effects in the marriage market.

2
See, for instance, Belley and Lochner (2007); Cameron and Taber (2004); Carneiro and Heckman (2002);
Johnson (2013); Keane and Wolpin (2001); Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011); Monge-Naranjo and Lochner
(2012); Ramsey (2015); Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2008).
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Furthermore, my modelling of the lawyer labor market builds on the literature studying
the gender gap in wages and career advancement in high-paying occupations such as corporate management, law, and academia.3 In this paper, I jointly model several elements
identified as important in the literature by incorporating them into a coherent structural
framework. These include the promotion structure, the time cost of childcare, and the
decision to exit an occupation.

1.2
1.2.1

Data
Institutional Background

The cost of obtaining a J.D. has risen significantly during the past couple of decades. Tuition
in 2014 was more than 60 percent higher in real terms than it was 15 years ago. Based on
a survey by the Department of Education in 2011, the average cost of obtaining a J.D.4
is $175,000 and remains as high as $152,000 even after including all grants. Consequently,
J.D. students borrow an average of $105,000 during law school, in addition to student debt
for prior education.5
There exists substantial heterogeneity in costs across schools, differences which are
strongly correlated with school quality. In 2014, the average cost of a J.D. at a top 10
school was $257,000, which was $58,000 higher than at schools ranked in the 31-40 range
and $78,000 higher than at schools ranked in the 91-100 range.6

3

See, among others, Albanesi and Olivetti (2006); Azmat and Ferrer (2014); Bell (2005); Bertrand et al.
(2010); Gayle et al. (2012); Ginther and Hayes (2003); Ginther and Kahn (2004); Goldin (2014); Selody
(2010).
4
Including tuition, fees, and living expenses.
5
Calculated by author using the 2011-12 National Postsecondary Student Aid Study through Powerstats.
6
Calculated by author using the Official Guide to Law Schools.
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J.D. graduates have a variety of labor market choices. To facilitate the analysis, I
classify the J.D. labor market into two broad occupations: the private law sector and the
public/business sector. The public sector consists of lawyers who work for federal, state,
and local governments, as well as public interest organizations. The business sector consists
of in-house attorneys for corporations and J.D. graduates who don’t practice law. This
classification is consistent with the usual practice of the American Bar Association. To
facilitate the analysis, I bundle the public and business sector into one category because
they have similar workplace structures, salaries, and work hours, and because the latter
sector is small in terms of share of employment.
The most unique feature that differentiates the private practice from the public/business
sector is the partnership orientation. New J.D.s are usually hired as associates and will be
evaluated for partnership promotion after six to nine years with the firm. Most large firms
have an “up-or-out” policy in which associates who do not make partner are required to leave
the firm.7 Partners usually share directly in the profits of the firm and earn substantially
higher salaries than associates. Partner positions can be regarded as tenured positions, as
termination and forced retirement are rare. The promotion decisions usually depend on
a number of factors including quality of past work, professional skills, ability to handle
complex matters, and ability to originate new clients. Most law firms implement annual
performance reviews of their associates. These are usually regarded as an essential part of
associate development.
The private law sector also differs from the public/business sector in terms of worklife balance and pay. The private law sector is client-oriented, and profitability depends

7

See Lehmann (2013) for more details.
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critically on both the size of the client base and the number of billable hours they can
charge. It is therefore commonplace for law firms to specify required minimum billable
hours for associates, especially in big law firms. In addition, the work schedule in private
practice can be quite inflexible in order to meet clients demands. In contrast, there is usually
only one fixed client in the public/business sector, namely the government or the corporation
in question. As a result, work hours are usually shorter and more regular, and the pay is
much lower than in the private law sector.
There exists one special type of government job that warrants separate discussion,
namely, judicial clerkships. The main task of clerks is to conduct research and draft memoranda and opinions for judges. Although regarded as intellectually stimulating and prestigious, these jobs are usually temporary and poorly paid. In that sense, they are similar to a
postdoctoral position in academia. The judicial clerkship positions are usually open to new
law graduates who spend a year or two clerking before embarking on their legal careers. In
2000, 11 percent of all J.D. graduates clerked after graduation. This rate was even higher
among graduates of top 20 law schools at 24 percent.8

1.2.2

Sample

To analyze the impact of student debt on career choices and marriage outcomes, I need a
dataset with measures of the debt burden, school choice, career choices, marriage outcomes,
and childbearing decisions for each individual. In particular, to account for fundamental
differences between sectors, the sampling period needs to be long enough to cover partnership
promotions. I also need measures for individual characteristics that may affect labor market

8

Calculated by author using the Official Guide to Law Schools.

8

decisions.
To this end, I exploit a novel dataset satisfying these requirements. After the JD is a
nationally representative longitudinal dataset constructed by the American Bar Foundation
and the National Association for Law Placement drawn from J.D. students graduating in
2000. The dataset covers the first twelve years of student careers. The estimation sample
contains a total of 1193 female individuals. Appendix A.1 provides the details on sample
selection. The respondents are surveyed three times: once each in 2003, 2007, and 2012.
This study uses the first two waves as the third wave has not yet been released.9
Respondents report total student debt upon graduation and the remaining debt in 2006.
They also report full employment history of organizational types and positions since 2000,
as well as salary and working hours for their 2003 and 2006 jobs. Marital status in 2003
and 2006,10 spousal salary in 2006, and the ages of all children as of 2007, are also reported.
Individuals report their law school as well, but this information is censored by the American
Bar Association. Instead, law schools are grouped into four tiers according to the rankings
in U.S. News and World Reports Rankings 2003. This publication ranks the top 100 law
schools in the country, and then assigns all unranked schools into one of two groups, Tier 3
or Tier 4. In the dataset, the American Bar Association bundles the top 20 schools as Tier
1 and the remaining ranked schools as Tier 2. So while I don’t observe the law school that
a particular individual attended, I do know which tier it belonged to.
Because debt is an endogenously chosen variable, one that is strongly related to the
choice of law school, I also need data on the initial conditions of individuals when making

9

2012 results will be incorporated into the analysis once available.
Cohabitation is counted as marriage. Cohabitation accounts for 3 percent of whole sample. The results
change little by treating cohabitation as single.
10
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law school choices. For example, it is important to have information about unpaid debt from
prior education and available monetary resources. To this end, I supplement After the JD
with the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study, a nationally representative survey of
students conducted by the U.S. Department of Education in 2000, approximately the same
cohort as the respondents in After the JD. The dataset contains 170 female J.D. students.
The dataset provides measures of outstanding college debt, various sources of funding for
law school education, tuition and expenses, and other demographics.
An empirical challenge still remains for the analysis of the tradeoff between school quality
and debt, as students are constrained by the admission rules of law schools. In both datasets,
I observe the student’s choice but not their choice set. Without explicitly accounting for
the admission rules, it is hard to separate a student’s preferences from her constraints when
choosing schools. I therefore exploit another novel dataset, Law School Numbers. Law School
Numbers was founded in 2003 as a free, publicly accessible database of user-supplied law
school applicant information. Users provide LSAT, GPA, application and later admission
portfolios. I extrapolate the admission rules in 1997 based on the 15,222 observations from
the 2003-2008 cycles.
Table 1.1 provides selected summary statistics. Prior debt represents the unpaid college
debt, with an average of $9, 400, which is much lower than the total amount of debt upon
graduation, which averages $85, 200. Savings represents all the non-debt monetary resources
students use to finance law school education, including family transfers, own savings, grants,
etc. In particular, I treat grants as exogenous because merit-based institutional grants are
very limited.11 Unpaid debt after 6 years is still very high, averaging $45,400. Females J.D.
11

In the sample, students on average receive $7,000 of merit-based institutional grant, which accounts for
only 6 percent of the cost of J.D. education. Only 11 percent of students receive merit-based institutional

10

students on average graduate at age 28, further reinforcing the importance of modelling
marriage and childbearing decisions in subsequent years. The median work week in the
private sector is 5 hours, or 11 percent, longer than in the public/business sector, while the
pay is around 40 percent higher.12
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics

Background

School Cost
Debt
Pay and Hours
(3 years postgraduation)

Pay and Hours
(6 years postgraduation)

LSAT
I(3.75 ≥ GP A ≥ 4)
I(3.50 ≥ GP A ≥ 3.75)
I(3.25 ≥ GP A ≥ 3.50)
Age upon graduation
Prior debt
Monetary resources
Tuition
Expense
Debt upon graduation
Unpaid debt after 6 years
Private Law
Annual Salary
Weekly Hours
Public/Business
Annual Salary
Weekly Hours
Private Law
Annual Salary
Weekly Hours
Public/Business
Annual Salary
Weekly Hours

Mean
157.9
25.9
26.4
24.1
28.3
9.4
56.3
65.5
55.7
85.2
45.4

Median
158.2

SD
6.8

4.6
13.7
48.8
11.3
2.6
58.3
46.6

N
170
219
223
204
1174
170
170
170
170
1193
1166

Dataset
NPSAS
AJD
AJD
AJD
AJD
NPSAS
NPSAS
NPSAS
NPSAS
AJD
AJD

27.0
0.0
47.5
59.7
54.0
85.3
35.2

115.9
47.8

105.5
50.0

50.8
12.7

431
405

AJD
AJD

80.0
45.3

64.3
45.0

80.7
11.9

279
213

AJD
AJD

131.9
48.9

117.4
50.0

64.1
13.4

376
442

AJD
AJD

98.9
44.8

89.2
45.0

40.6
13.5

403
452

AJD
AJD

AJD refers to After the JD. NPSAS refers to the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study.
All monetary values are in thousands of 2014 $.

grant covering 20 percent or more of the cost.
12
It is worth mentioning that the usual impression of long hours in the private practice may be more
strongly driven by males, whose median hours in private practice is 8 hours longer than in the public/business
sector. It could also be driven by the associates who work in big law firms. For instance, the median hours
in law firms with more than 250 lawyers are 53 for females and 57 for males, which are 8 and 12 hours
longer than their peers in the public/business sector. It would be interesting to conduct a gender difference
analysis or to break down the choice sets further by including types of private law firms.
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1.3

Measuring the Relationship between Debt and Choices of
Female Lawyers

I start the empirical analysis by documenting four facts about the relationship between debt,
career choices, marriage and childbearing outcomes. These facts motivate the modelling
choices.
I divide the sample into three groups of similar size by the amount of debt upon graduation. I call these groups Low Debt, Medium Debt, and High Debt. The average debt loads
for the three groups are $18,300, $84,900 and $145,500, respectively. I then calculate work
experience, marriage rates, spousal earnings and the probability of having children for each
group. I also calculate the gaps in these outcomes between each group and the Low Debt
group.13
Fact 1 Females with more debt have more work experience in private law firms.
I calculate work experience in private law firms through 7 years post-graduation for each
debt group. As displayed in Table 1.2, average work experience for the three groups is 2.52
years, 3.01 years, and 3.42 years, respectively. On average, private sector work experience
in the Heavy Debt group is 36 percent greater than in the Low Debt group. T-tests and
F-test show these gaps are statistically significant. This fact is consistent with Rothstein
and Rouse (2011), who find that student debt causes undergraduate students at a highly
selective university to avoid low-paid “public interest” jobs and choose substantially higher
paying jobs instead. It is worth noting that females spend less than half of their early careers
in private practice on average.
13

In the Appendix A.2 I also list the regression results including more controls. Results are unchanged.
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Table 1.2: Average Work Experience in Private Practice through 7 Years Post-Graduation
(in years)
Group
Group Avg
Group Diff
Low Debt ($18,300)
2.52
Mean S.E.
Medium Debt ($84,900)
3.01
Medium - Low 0.49 0.20
Heavy Debt ($145,500)
3.42
Heavy - Low
0.90 0.19
No differences across groups : p-value = 0.00

t-stat
2.45
4.61

Fact 2 Females with more debt are more likely to postpone marriage.

I calculate marriage rates by age 34 for each debt group. Table 1.3 shows that the
marriage rates for the three groups are 74 percent, 69 percent and 65 percent respectively.
A Heavy Debt individual is 12 percent less likely to be married by age 34 than a Low
Debt individual. These gaps are statistically significant.14 This fact is consistent with
Addo (2014), Bozick and Estacion (2014) and Gicheva (2014), all of whom document that
accumulated student debt is negatively related to the probability of first marriage using
national representative samples of NLSY97 participants, bachelor’s degree recipients, and
MBA students respectively.
Table 1.3: Marriage Rates by Age 34 (in percent)
Group
Group Avg
Group Diff
Low Debt ($18,300)
74
Mean S.E.
Medium Debt ($84,900)
69
Medium - Low
4.7
3.6
Heavy Debt ($145,500)
65
Heavy - Low
8.8
3.6
No differences across groups : p-value = 0.047

t-stat
1.30
2.48

Fact 3 Spouses of females with more debt have lower earnings.

I also compare the spousal earnings conditional on getting married. I use spousal earnings
to measure the “quality” of marriages. Table 1.4 shows that spouses of Low Debt females
14

I also calculate the marriage rates by other ages, but the pattern remains roughly the same both
quantitatively and statistically.
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earn an average of $113,000 annually, which is $16,000, or 16.5 percent, higher than their
High Debt counterparts. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study documenting
the relationship between student debt and spousal earnings.
Table 1.4: Spousal Earnings 6 Years Post-Graduation (in 2014$)
Group
Group Avg
Group Diff
Low Debt ($18,300)
113,000
Mean
S.E.
Medium Debt ($84,900)
99,000
Medium - Low 14,000 9,000
Heavy Debt ($145,500)
97,000
Heavy - Low
16,000 8,000
No differences across groups : p-value = 0.12

t-stat
1.52
1.97

Fact 4 Females with more debt are more likely to postpone childbearing.

Lastly, I compare the probability of having a child by age 34 across debt groups. Table
1.5 shows that Low Debt females are 30 percent more likely to have children by age 34 than
Heavy Debt females. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study documenting the
relationship between student debt and the probability of having children.
Table 1.5: Probability of Having a Child by Age 34
Group
Group Avg
Group Diff
Low Debt ($18,300)
0.49
Mean S.E.
Medium Debt ($84,900)
0.43
Medium - Low 0.06 0.04
Heavy Debt ($145,500)
0.38
Heavy - Low
0.11 0.03
No differences across groups : p-value = 0.007

t-stat
1.64
3.19

In summary, these facts demonstrate that females with heavy borrowing have substantially different career, marriage, and childbearing outcomes. To understand these facts and
to decompose the role of debt, it is important to develop a structural model for several
reasons. First, in the data I only observe marriage and childbearing outcomes instead of
options. Without accounting for the option to wait, I may either overestimate or underestimate the influence of debt burden. Second, females make joint decisions in the labor and
14

marriage markets, and the outcomes in the two markets may interact with each other. These
interactions can be exploited to design more effective policies. Third, a structural model
allows me to measure how the anticipation of a future debt burden distorts investments in
schooling quality.

1.4
1.4.1

Model
Environment

The model consists of two stages, the schooling stage and the post-graduation stage. There
are τ periods, with t = 1, 2, 3 corresponding to the schooling stage, and t = 4, ..., τ corresponding to the post-graduation stage. A period is equal to one year.
There is a continuum of females. Here I consider the decision problem of a single, childless
female characterized by age At , undergraduate grade points average GP A, LSAT scores
LSAT , monetary resources E, and unpaid student debt from undergraduate education DU .
E consists of parental transfers, own savings, grants, and other non-debt monetary resources
that can be used to pay for tuition.
I include age because it is strongly related to the marriage decisions of females. I include
GP A and LSAT as the measure of academic skills or initial achievements, and also because
they are the two most important determinants during admissions.15
There are J schools. School j charges tuition Tj , requires living expenses Pj , and implements admission rules Ψj (GP A, LSAT ) ∈ [0, 1]. Compared with undergraduate schools,
law schools offer fewer merit-based grants and scholarships. Therefore, I assume a common
15

In particular, law schools are required to publish statistics on number of applications and offers in each
interval of GPA-LSAT combination.
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tuition rate for all students. Also note the admission rules Ψj (·) accommodate uncertainty
in the admission process, since individuals with the same GP A and LSAT can have different
admission results.
Individuals make joint decisions at each period t regarding the following three sets of
discrete alternatives: (1) which school to attend at t = 1, Sj ={1: school j is chosen, 0:
otherwise}, j = 1, ..., J, (2) occupation choices Olt ={1: position l is taken, 0: otherwise}
at t = 4, ..., τ out of l = 1, ..., 5, (3) marriage timing decisions, Mt ={1: get married at t,
0: otherwise}. In particular, occupation alternatives consist of: a private law firm associate
position (l = 1), a partner position (l = 2), a public/business sector position (l = 3),
non-employment (l = 4), and a judicial clerk position (l = 5). The clerking option is only
available at t = 4, the first year post-graduation.
I denote the marital status for each period by mt ∈ {0, 1} to differentiate from the
marriage decision Mt . I denote the presence of children in the beginning of each period by
kt ∈ {0, 1}, which is an exogenous stochastic outcome.

1.4.2

Investment in Legal Education

At t = 1, the student applies to all schools and selects one from among those to which she
is admitted. She needs to finance the cost of education Tj + Pj with monetary resources E.
If these prove insufficient, then she must borrow DjG , where

DjG = max(Tj + Pj − E, 0)
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(1.1)

The total accumulated debt upon graduation from school j is

Dj = DjG + DU

(1.2)

The student can only borrow to finance tuition and basic living expenses. She cannot
borrow to boost consumption in the schooling stage. Schooling choices are only made once
at t = 1 and are irrevocable; students cannot drop out.16
Her flow utility from schooling stage is:

Ujt = ζj + gj (GP A, LSAT, E) + εSjt

(1.3)

for t = 1, 2, 3. ζj is the consumption value of attending school j, which captures direct utility
from consumption and nonpecuniary benefits, including safety, environment, location and
other factors. gj allows the preferences to depend on academic skills and monetary resources.
For instance, top law schools usually feature strong competition among students, so those
with better academic skills may adapt to the environment more easily than those with poor
academic skills. In addition, top law schools are mostly private institutions. Thus, students
with more monetary resources may find it easier to fit in. εSjt is the student’s idiosyncratic
preference shock for school j, following a Type I extreme value distribution.

16

3-year attrition rates are as low as 5 percent, as calculated by the author using the
enrollment and degrees awarded data published on the American Bar Association website,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_
to_the_bar/statistics/enrollment_degrees_awarded.authcheckdam.pdf.

17

1.4.3

Post-graduation Stage: Flow Utility

The flow utility in the post-graduation stage is specified as follows for t = 4, ..., τ :

Ult = Cltφ L1−φ
+ µ1 mt + µ2 mt Llt + µ3 kt Llt + µ4 kt Clt Llt
lt
+

J
X

(1.4)

M
µ5jl Sj + εO
lt + εt mt

j=1

The budget constraints for consumption Clt and leisure Llt are as follows:

Clt = Wlt (1 − mt ) + γ(Wlt + WtB )mt − dpt (Dj )

(1.5)

Llt = H − Hlt − λkt

(1.6)

where Wlt is labor income, Hlt is working hours, WtB is income of the husband if appliM
cable, dpt (·) is the formula for the installment of repayment,17 and εO
lt and εt are preference

shocks associated with each choice variable. Debt repayments follow a 10-year schedule with
equal installments and an interest rate of 7 percent. This specification is the default schedule
in the federal student loan program. After the JD surveys have shown that the utilization
of other repayment strategies is low. I am able to fit the remaining debt in 2006 quite well
using this specification.
It is worth mentioning that the J.D. cohort of 2000 had very limited access to repayment
17

The schedule for debt repayment is as follows:
dpt (D)

=

D

r
(1 + r)(1 − (1 + r)−T0 )

(1.7)

dmt (D)

=

D

1 − (1 + r)(t−T0 −1)
1 − (1 + r)−T0

(1.8)

where t is the period, dpt is the annual repayment, dmt is the remaining debt in the beginning of period t.
T0 is the initially scheduled length of repayment. Individuals pay equalized repayments during T0 . T0 is set
to be 10 years and r to 7 percent.
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subsidies. For that reason, I do not incorporate any such policy into the baseline model.18
I follow Keane and Wolpin (2010) by including a time cost for taking care of children
denoted by λ and an intra-family transfer rule γ. If the individual is married, she receives
a share γ of total household income. Individuals derive direct utility from marriage and
from the presence of a child. I allow these direct utilities to interact with consumption and
leisure through coefficients µ2 , µ3 and µ4 . For instance, females with expansive monetary
resources can afford to make more expensive educational investments in their children and
therefore derive greater happiness from the child’s development. Also, individuals with more
leisure can have better rest and relaxation and may enjoy childcare duty more than their
busy peers.
Individuals receive a nonpecuniary benefit µ5jl from each labor market position. This
captures the role of work schedule flexibility, stress, social status, and other unobserved
amenities. I allow the nonpecuniary benefits to differ by school in order to capture any
lingering effects. Law schools differ substantially in culture and career orientation. For
example, some schools may have better alumni connections in the private law sector. If
their graduates choose private practice, they may find colleagues who share common values,
experiences, and interests. This may lead them to attach a higher value to these types of jobs.
In contrast, other schools may promote more strongly the mission and importance of public
service. Their graduating students may find public sector employment more prestigious.
Ult is concave in both consumption Clt and leisure Llt . As a result, debt not only affects
the total budget and level of consumption, but also the marginal utility from consumption
18

There are mainly two types of loan forgiveness programs, funded by the federal governments or by the
law schools. The federal program requires 10 years of public service after October 2007. The school-funded
programs were generally severely under-funded when the sample graduated. See National Association for
Public Interest Law (2002).
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and leisure. An individual with a heavy repayment burden may derive higher utility from
a high-salary-long-hours job than a regular-salary-regular-hours job. They may also value
monetary transfers from spouses more strongly.
Because marital status has indirect effects on well-being, this specification admits a
non-trivial tradeoff between getting married and staying single. For example, a married
individual is more likely to have children, a prospect over which preferences are allowed to
vary. In addition, those married to low-earning husbands may suffer consumption loss due
to negative monetary transfers. Balancing these diverse concerns, individuals may find it
more desirable to enter marriage, or may prefer to stay single for the current period and
wait for a higher-earning marriage applicant to appear later.

1.4.4

Labor Market Decisions

Jobs differ in three aspects: the job offer distribution, nonpecuniary benefits (costs), and
promotion dynamics. A job offer is two-dimensional, consisting of a salary-hour pair. A
salary-hour pair is drawn from a multivariate lognormal distribution that depends on GP A,
LSAT , Sj , private sector work experience XtR , and public sector work experience XtP . In
each period, an individual receives up to one job offer for each type of job, and then decides
which offer to accept.19 In particular, private law firms feature a promotion process for
associates to advance to partners, allowing for uncertainty and learning.
The student acquires a unique time-invariant match value ξj for the private law sector
after graduating from law school j. ξj is not directly observed by the student. Instead, she
receives experience signals sjt in each period she works in private practice. These experience

19

See Appendix A.3 for more details.
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signals can be interpreted as reviews from senior partners, which impact one’s probability
of being promoted to partner. Individuals have prior beliefs about match values and have
an incentive to learn their match values through the experience signals.
The match value is drawn from Beta(η1j , η2j ) upon graduation and so ξj ∈ (0, 1). The
individual receives signal sjt about her match value at the end of t if she takes an associate
position. sjt is a Bernoulli random variable such that

P r(sjt = z) =




 ξj

if z = 1



 1 − ξj

if z = 0

(1.9)

Binary signals can be interpreted as “good” or “bad”.
I assume that the arrival rate of partner offers to private law firm associates evolves as
follows:



P r Receives a partner offer at period t XtR < 6 = 0

(1.10)



P r Receives a partner offer at period t XtR ≥ 6
(1.11)
PJ
Pt−1
exp( j=1 α0j Sj + α1 GP A + α2 LSAT + α3 XtR + α4 (XtR )2 )
s=1 sjs O1s
=
× P
PJ
t−1
R
R
2
1 + exp( j=1 α0j Sj + α1 GP A + α2 LSAT + α3 Xt + α4 (Xt )
s=1 O1s

Parameters α3 and α4 capture the idea that the promotion probability varies with experience in private law firms. Once promoted to partner, the position is secured, since in
reality a partner is usually a life-tenured position. In addition, I assume individuals have
to work in private law firms to receive partner offers. That is, the arrival rates of partner
offers to public/business sector employees is zero.20
20

These assumptions do not contradict any data. In reality, although it is possible for an experienced
public defender to directly receive a partner offer, it rarely happens for young lawyers.
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The individual does not know the true value of ξj . Instead, she has a belief about this
1 , B 2 ), which she updates at the end of each period t = 3, ..., τ . The
value given by Beta(Bjt
jt

initial belief at t = 3 is specified as

1
Bj3
= ξj exp(η0j )

(1.12)

2
Bj3
= (1 − ξj ) exp(η0j )

(1.13)

Individuals update beliefs according to Bayes’ rule:

1
1
Bjt
= Bj3
+

2
2
Bjt
= Bj3
+

t−1
X
s=4
t−1
X

sjs O1s

(1.14)

(1 − sjs )O1s

(1.15)

s=4

1.4.5

Marriage Market Decisions

The marriage market is characterized by stochastic assortative matching. The formulation
builds on Keane and Wolpin (2010). In each period, the single individual receives a marriage
offer with probability:

P r(Receives a marriage offer at period t) =

exp(β0M + β1M At + β2M A2t )
1 + exp(β0M + β1M At + β2M A2t )

(1.16)

I include At and A2t to describe the age effects.
The marriage offer consists of spousal earnings. A potential spouse’s earnings are given
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by:

ln WtB =

J
X

B
β3j
Sj + β1B dmt (Dj ) + β2B t + εB

(1.17)

j=1

Spousal earnings depend on the female’s outstanding debt dmt (Dj ) as well as her law school
Sj . This captures the idea that the quality of an individual’s pool of potential husbands
may depend on her own characteristics. In addition, there is an i.i.d. random component
εB that reflects a permanent characteristic of the potential husband. This component is
observed by the female at the time of meeting. After marriage, the husband’s earnings grow
according to a time trend.
Divorce is not modeled because divorce rates are low in the data.21

1.4.6

Childbearing

Children arrive stochastically, with arrival rates depending on At , A2t , and mt .22 The formulation is mainly for the purpose of replicating the patterns observed in the data. In
particular, after controlling for the aforementioned variables, debt is not significantly related to the probability of having children. I model childbearing as an exogenous process
rather than a direct choice. That said, being married is associated with a substantial increase in the probability of having children, so one can still treat childbearing as an indirect
endogenous choice realized through marriage decisions.

21

Only 6% of marriages end up in divorces over the sample period.
I allow the arrival rates to differ by schooling stage and post-graduation stage. See Appendix A.3 for
more details.
22
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1.4.7

Timeline and Sequential of Choices
t=1

Applies to all schools and receives admissions,
and marriage offers may arrive.
Makes joint schooling and marriage decisions.
May have a newborn child.

t ∈ {2, 3}

Marriage offers may arrive.
Makes marriage decisions.
May have a newborn child.

End of t = 3
t = 4, ..., τ

Draws a match value for private law firms.
Marriage offers and job offers may arrive.
Makes joint marriage and labor market decisions.
Consumes and makes debt repayment.
Receives signals and updates beliefs.
May have a newborn child.

1.4.8

Terminal Values

Because the data only covers the first seven years after graduation, it is not desirable to
estimate the model using an end-of-life horizon. Instead, I specify terminal value functions
and solve backwards from these. To minimize the impact of functional form assumptions, I
solve the model for an additional two years past the point which I have data, i.e. nine years
after graduation.23 The terminal value functions are currently set to be 0.24 .
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This procedure is consistent with Kaplan (2012).
The specifications will be relaxed when the third wave of data is available. It is projected to be released
at the end of 2015. In particular, the third wave of data is collected in the 12th year of post-graduation with
partner promotions largely finished. I will then extend the horizon and specify the terminal value function
to be proportional to the last period flow utility and estimate this proportionality parameter, as in Sauer
(2004) and Rust (1987).
24
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1.4.9

Value Functions

An individual maximizes expected lifetime utility by choosing one of the feasible discrete
alternatives in her time-dependent choice set in each period, until a known terminal period
τ.
The maximization of the objective function is achieved by a choice of an optimal sequence
of feasible control variables Sj for j = 1, ..., J, Olt for l = 1, ..., 5, and Mt ∈ {0, 1}, given
current realizations of the stochastic elements of the model. The maximization problem can
be recast in a dynamic programming framework by specifying the value function, Vt (Ωt ), as
the maximum over alternative-specific value functions that satisfy Bellman equations. Ωt
denotes the state space at time t.
When t = 4, ..., τ , the elements of Ωt are GP A, LSAT , Dj , XtR , XtP , mt−1 , kt , Sj , εO
lt ,
B
1
2
W H
εM
t , Wt , Bjt , Bjt , εlt ,εlt , {sjs }s=1,...,t−1 . When t = 2, 3, the elements of Ωt are GP A,

LSAT , Sj , Dj , mt−1 , kt , εSjt . When t = 1, the elements of Ωt are GP A, LSAT , DU , Y , εSjt .
Define the set of choice alternatives for Mt as follows,

ΘM (Ωt ) =




 {0, 1} if mt−1 = 0


 {0}

(1.18)

if mt−1 = 1

such that only single individuals make marriage decisions.
Marriage is an absorbing state, thus marital status follows the law of motion:

mt = mt−1 + Mt
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(1.19)

All individuals begin their economic life as childless singles. Thus

m0 = 0

(1.20)

In the post-graduation stage, for t = 4, ..., τ , the alternative-specific value function is
denoted as Vtl,i (Ωt ), where l = 1, ..., 5 corresponds to the labor market choice variable Olt ,
and i ∈ ΘM (Ωt ) corresponds to the marriage decision Mt . Define ul,i
t (Ωt ) = Ult (Mt = i, Ωt )
for t = 4, ..., τ ,


Vt (Ωt ) =
Vtl,i (Ωt )

=

max

l=1,..,5; i∈ΘM (Ωt )

ul,i
t (Ωt )



Vtl,i (Ωt )



+ ρE Vt+1 (Ωt+1 ) Olt = 1, Mt = i, Ωt

(1.21)
(1.22)

where E is the expectations operator, and ρ is the subjective discount factor. The expectation is taken over the joint distribution of the random elements of the model.
In the schooling stage when t = 2, 3, the alternative-specific value function is denoted
as Vti (Ωt ), where i ∈ ΘM (Ωt ) corresponds to the marriage decision Mt . Define ujt (Ωt ) =
PJ

j=1 Ujt (Mt

= i, Ωt )I(Sj = 1) for t = 2, 3,




Vti (Ωt )
i∈ΘM (Ωt )


j
i
Vt (Ωt ) = ut (Ωt ) + ρE Vt+1 (Ωt+1 ) Mt = i, Ωt
Vt (Ωt ) =

max

(1.23)
(1.24)

In the initial period when t = 1, the alternative-specific value function is denoted as
Vtj,i (Ωt ), where j = 1, ..., J corresponds to the labor market choice variable Sj , and i ∈
ΘM (Ωt ) corresponds to the marriage decision Mt . Define uj,i
t (Ωt ) = Ujt (Mt = i, Ωt ) for
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t = 1,


Vt (Ωt ) =
Vtj,i (Ωt )

1.5

=

max

j=1,..,J; i∈ΘM (Ωt )

uj,i
t (Ωt )


Vtj,i (Ωt )



+ ρE Vt+1 (Ωt+1 ) Sj = 1, Mt = i, Ωt

(1.25)
(1.26)

Estimation Strategy

I estimate the model by the method of simulated moments (MSM).25 Specifically, the MSM
estimator minimizes a weighted distance measure between sample aggregated statistics and
their simulated analogs. The weights are given by the inverse of estimated variances of the
sample statistics. The simulated moments are generated for any given set of parameters
by simulating 800 histories. Appendix A.4 lists the details of the data moments. The
estimated parameter values are reported in Appendix A.5 with standard errors. In this
section, I discuss why certain moments are chosen and how they help pin down parameters.
The first group of parameters relates to labor market outcomes, including the parameters
of the job offer distributions and the α’s in the arrival rate of partner offers. Job offer
distributions depend on sector-specific human capital stocks. Human capital stocks are a
function of law school quality, academic skills as measured by test scores, and sector-specific
work experience. Arrival rates of partner offers depend on this same set of variables. I
therefore rely on the mean and variance of accepted job offers along with observed promotion
probabilities interacted with those variables to pin down the corresponding parameters. I
account for the bias from self-selection by explicitly modelling occupational choices with
exclusion restrictions. Exclusion restrictions are variables that affect occupational choices
25

See McFadden (1989) and Pakes and Pollard (1989) for more details.
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but do not enter the outcome equations. I choose spousal income. Spousal income contains a
permanent stochastic component which affects labor market decisions by altering her budget
constraint. On the other hand, it is reasonable to assume that spousal income is unseen by
the employers.
The second group of parameters relates to marriage market outcomes, including the
β M ’s in the marriage offer arrival rates and the β B ’s in the marriage offer distribution.
Marriage offer arrival rates depend on age. The marriage offer distribution depends on law
school rankings. I therefore pin down the related parameters by interacting the observed
marriage rates and accepted spousal earnings with age and schools. A self-selection issue
similar to that in the labor market arises here: the rejected marriage offers are not observed.
I account for this bias by explicitly modelling the marriage choices with exclusion restrictions.
Exclusion restrictions are variables that affect the marriage decision but not the marriage
prospects, i.e. test scores LSAT and GP A.26 A second difficulty is to separately identify
offer distributions from arrival rates, in other words, to distinguish a model with low arrival
rates and a small mass of offers at the bottom of the spousal wage distribution from one
with a high arrival rate and more low-quality offers. To this end, I exclude variables that
affect marriage offer distributions but not offer arrival rates (i.e. schools Sj ).27
The third group of parameters relates to post-graduation preferences, including φ and
the µ’s. These parameters are largely pinned down by interacting observed occupational
choices with variables such as school, experience, test scores, debt, marital status, whether
children are present, and spousal earnings. The idea is that these interacted variables may
26

The idea is that these two variables measure the stock of knowledge related to the legal skills. But they
should not be related to attractiveness in the marriage market. The literature has widely recognized that
graduating schools may affect the pool of potential spouses, but none has stated that particular test scores
play a role, especially after the school quality has been controlled for.
27
This specification follows Keane and Wolpin (2010).
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affect occupational choices by altering the marginal utility derived from consumption and
leisure.
To estimate the third group of parameters, I exploit the large observed variation in
occupational choices. One particularly salient pattern concerns the high attrition rates in
the private law sector. As shown in Figure 1.1, the share of employment in the private law
sector shrinks by close to 50 percent for females from top schools. Similar patterns can
be observed for graduates from lower ranked schools. It is worth noting that most of these
attritions occur less than seven years after graduation, and thus far in advance of the partner
promotion evaluations.
Figure 1.1: Choice Probability of Private Law Jobs, Top 20 School Graduates
65
60

Percent(%)

55
50
45
40
35
30

2

3

4

5

6

7
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Law school class graduating at 2000. Constructed by author from After the JD.

However, an empirical challenge arises in how to separately identify the third group of
parameters from a fourth group of parameters, namely those associated with the learning
process. In particular, both sets of parameters affect occupational choices and can contribute
to high attrition rates in the private law sector. Consider, for example, the importance of
preferences. As individuals age, they make (or don’t make) transitions into marriage and
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parenthood. Their salaries also increase with accumulated work experience. These changes
can alter the relative attractiveness of outside options, a process governed by preference
parameters. On the other hand, with the presence of learning, some associates may gradually
realize that their promotion chances are small and opt out halfway. Promotion in the private
law sector is highly uncertain and depends on a lot of factors that are hard to accurately
predict by the new graduates. In the beginning of their careers, young lawyers tend to
“experiment” with this partner-track career path and thus the choice probability is high.
Those who later realize that their prospects are poor will exit.
My strategy is to include another set of moments, job transition rates by debt. When
the marginal utility of consumption is not constant, increasingly attractive outside options
affect females of various debt levels differently. This is because the main mechanism is the
consumption-leisure tradeoff, and debt affects the marginal utility of consumption. However,
the components in the learning process — the heterogeneity of “match values”, the signal
distribution, and the beliefs—do not vary with debt. Thus, the presence of learning narrows
the gap in job transition rates between high-debt and low-debt individuals.
The overall level of job transition rates also helps. First, without the additional contribution of learning, the model is not capable of generating sufficient attritions in the private
law sector. Second, introducing the permanent heterogeneity in “match values” will create
a higher level of persistence in job choices, especially in later periods.
I identify the fifth group of parameters, the preference parameters in the schooling stage,
by matching matriculation rates, average academic skills, monetary resources, remaining
debt, and total borrowing by school.
For certain parameters, structural estimation inside the model is less crucial than others.

30

As such, the estimation approach involves fixing some parameters using external estimates.
The subjective discount factor ρ is set equal to 0.96. Tuition Tj and living expenses Pj
are set equal to the average level in NPSAS.28 Admission rules Ψj are recovered using Law
School Numbers. Arrival rates of children, assumed to be exogenous, are estimated from
the After the JD. Lastly, based on estimates in other studies, the time cost of childcare is
set equal to 600 hours a year,29 the intra-family transfer rule is set equal to 0.55,30 and the
growth rate of spousal income over time is set equal to 5 percent.31

1.6

Empirical Results

This section isolates the underlying mechanisms through which debt burden affects choices.
I have modeled two channels: (1) tighter budget constraints; and (2) worsened marriage
prospects. Anticipation of these effects may also influence the ex ante schooling decisions.
The existing literature has largely focused on the consumption-leisure tradeoff triggered by
tighter budget constraints. However, I show that worsened marriage prospects play a more
salient role, at least among females.
Section 1.6.1 shows that the model is able to match the choice outcomes observed in the
data. Section 1.6.2 presents the key parameters related to the aforementioned channels and
the schooling decisions. Section 1.6.3 conducts two simulation exercises by shutting down
each channel respectively.
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As a robustness check, I compare the statistics with those in the Official Guide to Law Schools published
by the American Bar Association. They are similar.
29
Based on Keane and Wolpin (2010) and Hotz and Miller (1988).
30
Based on Keane and Wolpin (2010).
31
Based on Olivetti (2006).
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1.6.1

Model Fit

Table 1.6 shows the model fit for important statistics, including career choices, marriage
rates, spousal earnings, childbearing outcomes, matriculation rates, and debt loads.
First, the model reproduces differences in choices across debt levels. For instance, private
sector employment of High Debt females is around 10 percentage points higher than that of
Low Debt individuals in 2007. The model generates an acceptable difference of 7 percentage
points. With respect to family outcomes, the model predicts the roughly 9 percentage
point difference in marriage rates. The gap in accepted spousal earnings and the differential
probability of having a child can be reproduced well.
Second, the model captures the important life-cycle trends. One such trend is the decline
in private practice employment between 2003 and 2007. The data shows drops of 16 and 14
percentage points for the High Debt and Low Debt groups, respectively. The model produces
similar declines of 17 and 16 percentage points.
Third, matriculation rates by school tier are reproduced quite accurately. The model
also reflects the fact that students at top 20 schools borrow more than students at Tier 2
schools. Debt loads for students at Tier 3 and Tier 4 schools are slightly less well predicted.32

1.6.2

Key Parameter Estimates

Channel 1: Budget Constraints

Debt repayment shrinks the budget and affects

the consumption-leisure tradeoff when making decisions. This has a direct impact on labor
market decisions. Consider the problem facing a new graduate. On one hand, the private

32

The fit can be improved by including more preference parameters in the schooling stage. I choose to
maintain a more parsimonious model.
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Table 1.6: Model Fit

Share of Employment in Private Practice
Low Debt
High Debt
Marriage Rates
Low Debt
High Debt
Spousal Earning (2006)
Low Debt
High Debt
Presence of a Child
Low Debt
High Debt

Enrollment
Total Debt

Top 20
Data Model
0.24
0.23
92.3
96.3

21-100
Data Model
0.49
0.51
76.3
73.8

2003
Data Model

2007
Data Model

0.47
0.56

0.49
0.55

0.31
0.42

0.32
0.39

0.59
0.50

0.64
0.53

0.76
0.68

0.78
0.68

109.4
96.5

105.3
93.3

0.51
0.43

0.53
0.44

0.13
0.10

0.18
0.13

Tier 3
Data Model
0.15
0.14
74.2
81.0

Tier 4
Data Model
0.13
0.11
89.9
72.5

All the monetary values are in thousands of 2014 $.

sector offers greater financial compensation than the public/business sector. Starting salaries
in the private sector are 40, 32, 8, and 25 percent higher for Tier 1, 2, 3, and 4 students,
respectively. On the other hand, private sector jobs require 5 percent more hours on average,
a gap that increases by 1 percentage point every year.
My model captures the consumption-leisure tradeoff with two sets of parameters. First,
consumption and leisure enter the utility function through a Cobb-Douglas component,
inducing diminishing marginal utility. Second, I allow the psychic value of marriage and
children to depend on the levels of consumption and leisure.
Table 1.7 shows the importance of these parameters, by displaying the equivalent monetary value of leisure time by marital status, the presence of children, and debt level. To
facilitate the analysis, I consider a hypothetical female from a Tier 2 school who takes a
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job in the public sector at graduation. I calculate the cash transfer required for her to be
indifferent between working 4 more hours per week (i.e. average private sector hours). I
then examine how this monetary value changes with debt.
Those with heavy repayment burdens value leisure less than their low-debt peers. However, the effect of debt burdens on the consumption-leisure tradeoff is modest compared with
that of intra-family transfers and childcare. For instance, a single female with a low debt
burden is willing to work private sector hours if she is given $2,690 per period, while a highdebt female needs only $2,020. The corresponding values for a married female with children
are $8,190 and $6,870. This suggests that the differences in job choices across debt levels
may be more likely to result from different marriage and childbearing outcomes, instead of
the budget reduction from periodical debt repayment.
It warrants attention that the aforementioned results are only intended to demonstrate
the consumption-leisure tradeoff. Although the compensating cash transfer is very low,
individuals don’t necessarily switch to private practice because nonpecuniary benefits in the
public sector are higher.
Table 1.7: Consumption-Leisure Tradeoff in Labor Market Decisions by Debt
Compensating Cash Transfer for a Typical Public Sector Employee
to Work Private Sector Hours:
Low Debt High Debt
Single
2.69
2.02
Married w/o Children
4.16
3.50
Married w/ Children
8.19
6.87
Monetary values are in thousands of 2014 $.

Channel 2: Marriage Prospects

I proceed by discussing the parameters that connect

debt and marriage. First, debt has a large impact on the quality of marriage offers. Mean
earnings among potential husbands decline by 3 percent for every $10,000 of outstanding
34

debt. The intuition is that debt reduces an individual’s popularity in the marriage market.
The marriage offer distribution may affect marriage decisions through the intra-family
transfer. Females receive 55 percent of household income when married. As a result, a
female needs to draw a husband with earnings that, at minimum, are roughly in line with
her own for marriage to raise her own consumption. Of course, there is also a psychic value
to being married.
As explained in the previous section, the level of consumption also affects the psychic
value of having children. This channel may affect marriage decisions because child arrival
rates are found to be closely related to marital status. The probability of having a child for
a married female at age 30 is 0.35 higher than that of a single peer. Therefore, females with
worse marriage prospects may have an extra incentive to postpone marriage, as their utility
from having children is likely to be lower.
The marriage decision is further complicated by the declining marriage offer arrival rates.
For an individual of average characteristics, the arrival rate at age 27 is 46 percent, declining
to 31 percent at age 30. By age 34, it drops to 8.5 percent. This decline suggests that it is
very costly to postpone marriage until the debt burden is clear.
I show the importance of worsened marriage prospects by comparing marriage offers and
outcomes of two groups of single individuals from Tier 2 schools in the first period of the
post-graduation stage. These groups differ in debt burden but are otherwise identical. Figure
1.2 compares the distribution of offered and accepted spousal earnings. Both distributions
for the High Debt group are to the left of those for the Low Debt group. In addition, the
High Debt group has a lower marriage rate, 20 percent, relative to the Low Debt group, 30
percent.
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One may wonder why the distributions of accepted spousal earnings are more similar
across debt levels than the distributions of offers. One explanation is the aforementioned
intra-family transfer. Females have incentives to maintain their level of consumption and not
to choose a substantially lower-earning husband. However, once this standard is satisfied,
high-debt females seem to have a greater acceptance region than their low-debt peers, which
explains why their accepted offers are relatively distributed to the left. However, because the
marriage offer distribution is much worse, high-debt females are still less likely to marry. This
underlines the importance of using a structural model to analyze the effect of debt on marital
prospects. Marriage is a choice, one that is made only when the offer is sufficiently attractive.
Simply looking at realized spousal earnings can vastly understate the true differences in
marriage market prospects across debt levels.
Figure 1.2: Marriage Offers and Accepted Spousal Earnings
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Note: The comparison are for two groups of hypothetical single individuals from 20-100-ranked schools who
differ in debt burden but identical otherwise in the initial period of post-graduation stage.
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I provide external evidence to explore why the quality of marriage offers decreases with
debt burden. After the JD asks the following question: How many days during the last
week have you have trouble getting to sleep or staying asleep? I calculate the probability
of having sleep trouble for more than the median number of days (= 1 day), and examine
its relationship with debt burden. I find a statistically significant relationship between debt
burdens and sleep trouble for married females but not for singles. The relationship is even
stronger after controlling for job sector choice, spousal earnings, and other characteristics.33
As sleep disorder is often an indicator of stress, this relationship suggests that females with
heavy borrowing may have more pressure in their married lives than those without debt.
Therefore, males may find such females less attractive as marriage partners in anticipation
of later stress. This piece of evidence is consistent with findings in Field (2009) about the
psychological aversion of student debt using a sample of NYU J.D. students.
Schooling Decisions

Individuals balance the return to school quality versus the cor-

responding debt when making schooling decisions. School quality has a large impact on the
job offer distribution in the labor market. In the public/business sector, the mean salary for
Tier 1 graduates is 21 percent higher than for Tier 2 graduates, 23 percent higher than for
Tier 3 graduates, and 40 percent higher than for Tier 4 graduates. The compensation gap
is even more pronounced in the private sector, where the mean salary for Tier 1 graduates
is 29 percent higher than for Tier 2 graduates, and 55 percent higher than for graduates of
Tier 3 and Tier 4 schools. I also find a high degree of assortative matching in the marriage
market. After controlling for other characteristics, spousal earnings for Tier 1 graduate are
35 percent higher than for Tier 2 graduates, 45 percent higher than for Tier 3 graduates,

33

See Table A.8 in Appendix A.7 for details.
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and 60 percent higher than for Tier 4 graduates.

1.6.3

Decomposition

I proceed to disentangle the net effects of these two channels. Individuals make joint decisions
in various markets and the two channels are intertwined. To facilitate the analysis, I divide
individuals into two groups by debt upon graduation and then calculate group differences
in the share of private practice employment, marriage rates, accepted spousal earnings, and
probability of having a child. I conduct this exercise three times: under the baseline model,
under equalized budget constraints, and under equalized marriage prospects. In the second
scenario, individuals do not need to make annual debt repayments. In the third scenario,
marriage prospects are not affected by debt burden. To guarantee comparable samples
across the three scenarios, I hold the schooling choices fixed at the baseline outcomes.
Figure 1.3 shows the decomposition results with respect to sector choice. In the baseline
model, the share of high-debt group individuals employed in private practice is roughly 7
percentage points higher than for their low-debt peers. Under equalized budget constraints,
the gap is roughly the same in the beginning, but decreases to 5 percentage points seven
years later. Under equalized marriage prospects, the gap is reduced to 4 percentage points in
the beginning, and further decreases to around 3 percentage points seven years later. Over
the seven year span, the first channel alone can explain around 15 percent of the choice
difference, while the second channel alone can explain up to 40 percent.
Figure 1.4 shows the decomposition results for marriage rates. The baseline marriage
rates differ by around 10 percentage points between the low-debt and high-debt individuals.
The gap narrows by 1 percentage point under equalized budget constraints. In contrast, the
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gap narrows by around 6 percentage points under equalized marriage prospects.
Figure 1.5 shows the decomposition results for accepted spousal earnings. The baseline
difference in accepted spousal earnings is $13,000 in favor of low-debt individuals. The
difference is slightly amplified when the budget constraints are equalized. When marriage
prospects are equalized, however, the gap is reversed. In this case, spousal earnings for the
high-debt individuals are $5,000 to $10,000 higher than for low-debt individuals.
Figure 1.6 shows the decomposition results for the probability of having a child. Low-debt
individuals are more likely to have children than their high debt peers, with the difference
in probability ranging from 0.02 in early years to 0.09 seven years later. The difference is
only mildly reduced by equalizing the budget constraints. However, with equalized marriage
prospects, it is reduced by more than half.
Figure 1.3: Differences in Private Practice Employment Rates by Debt Levels
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The broad intuition for these results is as follows. Holding the marriage offer distributions
fixed, increasing consumption under equalized budget constraints decreases the marginal
utility from consumption and increases the marginal utility from having children. Individuals
will then lower their acceptance threshold for spousal earnings in order to marry earlier and
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Figure 1.4: Differences in Marriage Rates by Debt Levels
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Figure 1.5: Differences in Accepted Spousal Earnings by Debt Levels
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Figure 1.6: Differences in Probability of Having a Child by Debt Levels
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have children earlier. Thus, we see a smaller gap in marriage rates accompanied by a wider
gap in accepted spousal earnings, as in Figure 1.4 and 1.5.
The marriage prospects channel is more important than the budget constraint channel
for explaining the gaps in marriage outcomes. Under equalized marriage prospects, highdebt individuals meet higher-earning marriage applicants, which leads to higher monetary
transfers from their husbands. Consequently, these individuals are more likely to get married
and end up with higher quality marriages.
One may ask why the second channel is particularly salient, given that both operate
through consumption. The intuition is that the option value of waiting is different. In the
first channel, high-debt and low-debt individuals differ in consumption by their annual debt
repayment burden, which is an obligatory outlay. This part of the consumption difference
will not be changed by the timing or quality of marriage. In the second channel, the
consumption differs through the level of spousal earnings and the associated intra-family
transfer. This part of the consumption difference is endogenously determined by marriage
decisions. As a result, the second channel has a much larger effect on the timing of marriage
decisions.
One may further ask why the difference in accepted spousal earnings is reversed under
equalized marriage prospects in Figure 1.5. Recall that graduates of expensive top-20 schools
tend to carry higher debt burdens. But these graduates also enjoy a premium in the marriage
market by virtue of their educational background. Thus, they typically end up with higherearning spouses.
In addition, one may wonder why there still exists a gap in marriage rates even under
equalized marriage prospects, as shown in Figure 1.4. One possible explanation appeals to
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the aforementioned selection effect. Graduates of top-20 schools have higher average debt
loads, but also enjoy higher earning potential, which creates different incentives for the
timing of marriage and children.
Now I proceed to explain the intuition of debt effects on labor market decisions. First, as
explained above, debt has a large effect on marriage decisions and the associated childbearing
outcomes. As childcare is time-costly, individuals who are more likely to marry are less likely
to work in the sector requiring the longest working hours. Secondly, as debt repayment
shrinks the budget, there exists a consumption-leisure tradeoff in balancing earnings and
hours of labor market decisions.
In summary, worsened marriage prospects associated with debt burden have a much
stronger impact on post-graduation choices than tighter budget constraints. In particular, a
large part of the differences in labor market choices can be explained by high debt individuals
facing worse marriage opportunities, and therefore marrying later and having children later.
Finally, I decompose how these two channels affect ex ante schooling choices, holding
school costs and admission rules fixed. Figure 1.7 shows the results. The individuals who are
affected the most are those who are admitted to top-20 schools but choose to attend Tier
2 schools. When the two debt effects are eliminated, first the budget constraint channel
and then the marriage prospects channel, matriculation rates at top-20 schools rise by 2
and 3 percentage points, respectively. This corresponds to increases of 8.6 percent and 13.0
percent relative to the baseline. Matriculation rates at Tier 2 schools fall by roughly the same
amount. The marriage prospects channel has a stronger effect than the budget constraint
channel. Matriculation rates at Tier 3 and Tier 4 schools remain roughly unchanged, which
is possibly because the admission rules are binding, and so students have limited academic
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mobility.
Figure 1.7: Change in Matriculation Rate
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It is worth noting that my finding is largely consistent with Sauer (1998, 2004). He
accounts for the different earning profiles and nonpecuniary benefits across occupations.
Debt repayment therefore affects career choices through the tradeoff between earnings and
nonpecuniary benefits. This mechanism is comparable to my first channel, the consumptionleisure tradeoff. Both of us find that the effect of this channel is small.

1.7

Evaluating Loan Repayment Assistance Programs

The decomposition analysis has shown that the debt effect on career choices through marriage prospects is large. Therefore, it is important to take the marriage market features into
account when designing loan forgiveness policies. Currently the Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program (U.S. Department of Education) entails enrolling into an income-contingent
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repayment scheme. After ten years of public service, the remaining debt is discharged.
However, my estimates show that marriage opportunities decline substantially with age.
Therefore, younger females may be more responsive to repayment subsidies, and it may be
more effective to subsidize females sooner rather than later.
To test the idea, I compare two expenditure-equivalent counterfactual policies: a public
service loan forgiveness policy and a conditional tuition waiver policy. The loan forgiveness
policy replicates the key features of the existing scheme. To be eligible for this plan, individuals must join an income-contingent repayment plan. Repayments are set equal to 20 percent
of disposable income.34 All outstanding debt is discharged after individuals accumulate six
years of public sector work experience. The tuition waiver policy is similar in some respects,
but different in others. Individuals join the same income-contingent repayment plan, but
rather than waiting several years for debt forgiveness, a certain percentage of total debt
is forgiven immediately upon graduation. This forgiveness is not without conditions. The
discharged debt must be repaid unless a job in the public sector is held for six years subsequent to graduation. To ensure equal expenditures, the proportion of initially-forgiven debt
is set to 18 percent. Individuals are not forced into either of these plans. Upon graduation,
they make a one-time choice between the counterfactual policy and the 10-year standard
repayment schedule.
Note that these two policies have the same requirement for loan forgiveness, namely,
a specified number of years in the public sector. However, the timing of the benefits differs. The conditional tuition waiver policy gives individuals the opportunity to exploit loan
forgiveness benefits before the requirement is fully satisfied.
34

See the details of this plan on the website of the Office of Federal Student Aid, https://studentaid.
ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/understand/plans/income-driven.
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Table 1.8 shows the results. Case (A) corresponds to my baseline model when there are
no repayment subsidies. In case (B), individuals have access to the loan forgiveness policy.
In case (C), individuals have access to the conditional tuition waiver policy.
The average work experience in the public sector is 3.4 years when there are no repayment
subsidies. The loan forgiveness policy increases public sector work experience to 3.5 years. 38
percent of individuals sign up, but only 11.7 percent accumulate enough experience to receive
the benefit. A conditional tuition waiver policy increases public sector work experience to 3.8
years. It also has a wider appeal: 80 percent of individuals sign up, and 21.3 percent stay for
the required six years. The tuition waiver policy spreads out the same amount of expenditure
to benefit a larger population. Intuitively, as debt plays a bigger role in the marriage market
when individuals are younger, a smaller early subsidy can be more attractive than a larger
later one. Columns on the marriage rates and the spousal earnings provide supporting
evidence. The loan forgiveness policy barely changes the marriage outcomes. In contrast,
the conditional tuition waiver policy increases marriage rates by 1.1 percentage points, and
the accepted spousal earning by $2,200, or 2.3 percent.
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Table 1.8: Counterfactual Policy Analysis

(A) No Policy
(B) Loan Forgiveness
(C) Tuition Waiver

Avg Years
in Public Sector
3.4
3.5
3.8

Marriage
Rates
73.3
73.5
74.4

(A) No Policy
(B) Loan Forgiveness
(C) Tuition Waiver

Avg Debt
(in 2014 $1,000)
77.7
77.8
77.8

School Choice (%)
Top 20 21-100 Tier 3
23.4
51.3
14.4
23.8
50.9
14.7
23.5
51.2
14.7

a

46
b

Spousal
Earning
97.1
97.0
99.3

Enrollment
(%)

Beneficiaries
(%)

38.0
80.0

11.7
21.3

Tier 4
10.8
10.6
10.5

Loan Forgiveness: Individuals must join the income-contingent repayment plan. All
outstanding debt is discharged after individuals accumulate six years of public sector
work experience.
Tuition Waiver: Individuals must join the income-contingent repayment plan. 18 percent
of total debt is forgiven immediately upon graduation. The discharged debt must be
repaid unless a job in the public sector is held for six years subsequent to graduation.

I also examine the impact of these policies on the ex ante schooling choice and debt
accumulation. Average borrowing increases only slightly. The magnitude is small, perhaps
because the policies are not overly generous.35 The two repayment subsidies alter the tradeoff between schools of different qualities. The loan forgiveness policy encourages Tier 2
students to attend Tier 1 schools. The matriculation rate at top-20 schools increases by 1.7
percent. The tuition waiver policy plays a weaker role in the schooling choices of students in
the top two tiers, but a stronger role for students in the bottom two tiers. The matriculation
rate at Tier 3 schools increases by 2.1 percent.

1.8

Summary

This paper studies the impact of student debt on the education, career, and marriage choices
of female lawyers. Motivated by the strong correlations between student debt and outcomes
observed in a new dataset, I develop a dynamic model of education, marriage and labor
markets. My model accounts for several important features of the legal labor market, including partnership promotions, differences in the work hours across occupational tracks,
and the clerkship choice. In particular, by introducing a learning process, my model is able
to predict the important patterns observed in the data.
In the model, debt affects lifetime budget constraints and marriage prospects. I find that
a large part of the differences in female career choices is driven by debt-related differences
in marriage market prospects. In addition, females significantly under-invest in education
quality in order to avoid the marriage market penalties associated with higher future debt
burdens. The affected lifetime budget constraints, however, have a much smaller effect on
35

In reality, there are a number of more generous policies, mostly offered by the law schools.
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female choices.
This finding suggests that timing is important for loan repayment assistance programs
that aim to increase public sector employment. The reason is that the effect of debt on
marriage prospects is large, and marriage opportunities decline as females age. I therefore
compare the effects of two counterfactual policy designs with identical expenditure levels:
a public sector loan forgiveness policy and a conditional tuition waiver policy. The second
policy is much more effective at increasing public sector employment because it provides
repayment subsidies at an earlier age.
The methods developed in this paper and the main empirical results are promising for
future research. An interesting research question would be to study the general equilibrium
effects of repayment subsidies. This paper finds that females tend to choose lower-ranked,
cheaper law schools to avoid debt. Loan repayment subsidies ease this aversion and increase a
law student’s willingness to borrow. A relevant concern for policy makers is whether schools
will respond by increasing tuition.36 It is worth noting that higher tuition is not necessarily
an inefficient outcome. Schools care about education quality. Higher tuition may be used to
increase educational resources and improve education quality, thereby raising labor market
returns. Therefore, it is important to model the tradeoff schools face between displacing
qualified but financially disadvantaged students and augmenting monetary resources by
36
There exists a very small literature studying the general equilibrium effects of financial aid policies on
the schools’ tuition levels. Epple et al. (2013) estimate a general equilibrium model of the college education
market and find that private schools would strategically increase tuition and offset the increased grant
available to students. Turner (2014) finds that colleges capture 12 percent of their students’ Pell Grant aid
through price discrimination, using a regression discontinuity design. Cellini and Goldin (2014) document
that the for-profit colleges eligible for federal student aid programs charge tuition that is 78 percent higher
than that charged by comparable non-eligible ones. Lucca et al. (2015) find that institutions more exposed
to changes in the subsidized federal loan program increased their tuition disproportionately around these
policy changes. Overall, these four studies suggest that part of the aid will be captured by the schools. But
the effect of policies subsidizing repayments, especially the policies that depend on labor market outcomes,
have not yet been studied.
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charging higher tuition.
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Chapter 2

The Impact of Unions on Municipal
Elections and Urban Fiscal Policies 1
2.1

Motivation

States and local jurisdictions play essential roles in the allocation of public goods and services
in the U.S. and other developed countries, that have adopted a decentralized organization
of government (Oates (1972)). The efficient decentralized provision of public goods requires
that special interest groups do not exercise undue influence on the outcome of municipal
elections and local fiscal policies. This paper focuses on the most important local special
interest group: municipal unions.2 I provide a new model that captures the impact of local
unions on the outcome of municipal elections and local fiscal policies and tests the empirical
1
This chapter was prepared for the November 2012 Carnegie Rochester NYU Conference on Public Policy,
at Carnegie Mellon University. This chapter is co-authored with Holger Sieg. Sam Gerson provided excellent
research assistance. Financial support for this research is provided by the National Science Foundation (SES0958705).
2
According to 2011 CPS data, 43.1 percent of local public employees are union members and 46.6 percent
are covered under union contract. 63.5 percent of police officers and 61.1 percent of firefighters are union
members.
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implications of the model using a new unique data set.
Since the early 1960’s public sector unions have increasingly represented municipal workers in collective bargaining in most U.S. cities. While there is some debate in the literature
about the objectives of municipal unions, there is broad agreement that municipal unions
can extra rents from local governments.3 I model the behavior of a union as seeking direct transfers from a local government to the union and its members. These transfers can
take the form of higher wages and benefits, but they may also include more favorable work
rules or higher levels of employment.4 From the perspective of voters, who primarily care
about the quality and the costs of providing local public goods and services, transfers to
unionized workers create inefficiencies, since the city does not operate at a cost minimum.5
Everything else equal, voters prefer that the city operates on an efficient scale and pays
competitive wages and benefits avoiding unnecessary transfers to unionized workers.
Political economy reasons may prevent the city from operating efficiently since local
politicians have incentives to accommodate public sector unions.6 While there is some
agreement that private companies maximize profits or shareholder value, there is less agreement about the objectives of local politicians. Local politicians care about the welfare of
the citizens, but they also want to win elections. Public sector unions can affect electoral
outcomes by mobilizing its members, increasing voter-turnout, endorsing a politician, and
providing staffing for a campaign. I model the objective function of a local politician as
3

For a detailed discussion of the objectives of unions see Farber (1986).
Lewis (1990) suggests that municipal wages are, on average, 8 to 12 percent higher than wages in the
private sector. More recently, Hoxby (2000) finds positive effects of unionization on teacher compensation.
Frandsen (2016) finds similar effects for firefighters and police officers who are also studied in this paper.
5
Feiveson (2015) shows that unions can also determine how cities spend intergovernmental transfers.
Cities in states with with pro-union collective bargaining laws spend a higher fraction of transfers on increased
wages than cities in other states.
6
In the absence of market discipline, Gregory and Borland (1999) argue that the public sector outcomes
are primarily determined by political considerations.
4
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a weighted average of the objectives of voters and the objectives of a municipal workers’
union. Moreover, politicians differ in the weight that they assign to the public cause. As a
consequence, some politicians are more union-friendly than others.
I consider a game in extensive form in which an incumbent faces a challenger in a local
election. This election can be thought of as a primary within a party that controls a city or
a general election between candidates from different parties in a competitive, non-partisan
environment. Voters know the preferences of the incumbent, based on his or her historical
record in office. Voters face more uncertainty about the position of the challenger. One
key assumption of my model is that the union is better informed about the preferences of
potential challengers than the public. This assumption is plausible since unions often track
politicians and have better access to candidates than individual voters.
Given these informational asymmetries, the union can convey a signal to voters by endorsing a candidate. The voters observe the endorsement decision of the union before the
election. Voters also receive a common preference shock associated with each politician. The
outcome of each election is, therefore, ex ante uncertain. Since politicians cannot commit to
a policy or a transfer to the union prior to the election, the politician that wins the election
implements his preferred policy when in office. I focus my analysis on perfect Bayesian
equilibria. I provide conditions which guarantee that equilibria exist and characterize their
properties.
One key finding of the theoretical analysis highlights the inherent conflict faced by the
municipal union. Union support increases the chances of winning the election. This “muscle
effect" depends on how well the union is organized in the city and how much support it
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can generate among likely voters.7 At the same time, the endorsement generates a negative
informational externality. Voters observe the endorsement and update their beliefs about the
position of the challenger. If the challenger receives the endorsement, voters will infer that
the challenger places a higher weight on the objectives of the union than the incumbent. A
necessary condition for the existence of an equilibrium with endorsement is that the positive
“muscle effect" is larger than than the negative informational effect. This condition is not
sufficient to generate an endorsement if the difference in positions between the two politicians
is small or if the endorsement costs are large.
The second contribution of the paper is that I have assembled a novel data set that
includes municipal elections in the largest cities in the U.S. The unique feature of my data
set is that I have collected detailed information on union endorsements for each election
in the sample. To my knowledge, there have been no previous empirical papers that have
analyzed endorsement data. Previous empirical papers have used different measures of
union strength or unions activity. One commonly used variable constructed by Freeman
and Valletta (1988) measures the collective bargaining strength of unions at the state level.
Other popular variables are the fraction of unionized workers or the fraction of workers that
are covered by a union contract. While these are interesting outcome variables, they are not
direct measures of a union’s political activities. To obtain a better measure I focus on union
endorsements.
I collected the information about union endorsements by searching electronic archives
of local newspapers. Most cities in my sample have, at least, one large local newspaper
7

Voter turnout is notoriously low in many municipal elections, which makes it possible that get-out-the
vote campaigns of unions can be effective. Courant et al. (1979) argue that unions care about employment
size to increase the political strength of the union. Bennett and Orzechowski (1983) provide some evidence
that suggests that unions have a significant impact on local elections.
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which covers local political events. The influence of newspapers on voting behavior has
been widely studied in political economics.8 Local newspapers provide an important forum
for politicians and unions to announce their positions and are, therefore, reliable sources to
obtain endorsement information.
My data set consists of general and run-off elections held in large U.S. cities during the
past two decades. I supplement the election and endorsement data with U.S. Census data
that characterize urban fiscal policies. My sample consists of 292 elections that pitted an
incumbent mayor against a challenger in one of 92 different cities. My paper is the first
paper that provides a rigorous empirical analysis of the effects of union endorsements on
electoral and economic outcomes for a large sample of U.S. cities.
The third contribution of the paper is that I provide new evidence and quantify the
impact of unions on local elections and fiscal policies. I find that challengers strongly benefit
from endorsements in competitive elections. My model also has significant implications for
the change in public policy after the election. Consider the case in which the union endorses
the challenger, and the challenger defeats the incumbent in the election. In this case, my
model predicts an increase in the size of the public sector following the election. My empirical
analysis provides some evidence suggesting that challengers that receive a union endorsement
adopt more union-friendly fiscal policies after they have defeated an incumbent.
My paper is closely related to the topic of this Carnegie Rochester NYU conference issue
of the journal. It has been widely recognized that fiscal federalism and interjurisdictional
competition can have a variety of positive economic effects. Tiebout (1956) argues that
8

Snyder and Strömberg (2010) find that voters have better information about their House Representatives
if there is local newspaper coverage. Chiang and Knight (2011) find that newspapers endorsements are
influential in voters’ decisions during presidential elections. Gerber et al. (2009) find that local newspapers
affect readers’ voting decisions in gubernatorial elections.
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fiscal competition leads to a better tailoring of expenditure policies to local needs.9 “Tiebout
competition" may also lead to efficiency gains in the provision of public goods.10 Besley and
Case (1995) show that fiscal decentralization can lead to increased levels of efficiency due to
“Yard Stick Competition." Brennan and Buchanan (1980) argue that decentralization is an
effective mechanism to control governments’ expansive tendencies due to increased electoral
accountability. Epple and Romer (1991) show that decentralization provides an effective
tool to limit potentially harmful redistribution. Finally, decentralization may also lead to
more experimentation with innovative policies Rose-Ackerman (1980).
Despite these potential benefits of decentralization, some researchers and policy analysts
have argued that the recent economic recession has put state and municipal finance under
stress calling into question the sustainability of fiscal federalism. Some local politicians
appear willing to accommodate local unions and public employees leading to an adoption of
policies that are not in the interest of voters.11 These inefficiencies in local public finance
can have potentially large implications for the aggregate economy. The analysis of this
paper addresses these questions by focusing on the impact of municipal unions on local
fiscal policies.12

9
Epple and Sieg (1999) and Epple et al. (2001) estimate and test models that formalize Tiebout’s
conjecture.
10
Competition between the public and private sector may also be beneficial. Friedman (1955), suggested to
use vouchers to increase competition among public and private schools to raise school quality. Hoxby (2000)
provides some empirical evidence that suggests that competition among public school districts increases test
scores. Calabrese et al. (2012) argue that distortions from decentralization can arise if equilibrium household
sorting is not optimal.
11
The New York Times published an article by Santos and Chen (2012) on the front page claiming that
Michael Mulgrew, the president of the New York teachers’ union, is a "coveted friend for the people who
hope to become the next mayor."
12
There has been little research that focuses on special interest groups at the state or local level. Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) find no evidence that political partisanship of the mayors affect the size of city
government, the allocation of local public spending, or crime rates. Boustan et al. (2012) find that growing
inequality is associated with an expansion in government revenues and expenditures on a wide range of
services in U.S. municipalities and school districts.
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2.2

Model

I develop a model to study the impact of a special interest group on electoral outcomes and
fiscal policies in a city.13

2.2.1

Preferences and Actions

There are three types of players in my model: a large number of voters, a union, and two
politicians seeking to be elected to become the mayor of a city. I distinguish between an
incumbent denoted by I and a challenger denoted by C.
There is a continuum of voters with mass normalized to one. Voters care about the
policy enacted after the election. Let R denote the exogenously given revenue available to
the municipality and T the transfer to the union and its members.14

Assumption 1
The quality of public good provision is given by

q = q(R − T )

(2.1)

The transfer to the union thus creates an inefficiency in public good provision. Voters would
prefer to set T = 0.
The union only cares about the magnitude of the transfer that it receives from the elected

13

Coate and Morris (1995) study transfers to special interest groups under commitment. Grossman
and Helpman (1996) study how special interest groups make contributions to affect the equilibrium policy
platforms under commitment. Grossman and Helpman (1999) treat endorsements as a language of communication between well-informed interest group leaders and lesser informed members.
14
It is straight forward to endogenize local revenues. The key results of the paper only depend on the
fact the politicians can be ranked on a one-dimensional index by voters.
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politician.15
Assumption 2
The utility function of the union is given by ug (T ), which is strictly increasing in T .
Prior to the election the union can endorse, at most, one politician and provide active
campaign support for the endorsed politician. Let dg denote an indicator variable that is
defined as follows:

dg =










1 : if the union endorses the incumbent,
0 : if the union endorses neither candidate,









(2.2)

−1 : if the union endorses the challenger.

Endorsement costs are denoted by c ∈ {cI , cC }. The endorsement influences the outcome of
the campaign by shifting voter preferences. As explained in detail below the union choses
an endorsement strategy to maximize expected utility.
Voters’ preferences satisfy the following conditions:
Assumption 3
a) The utility function of each voter is additively separable between the utility associated with
policy q, a common preference shock for each the politician, and the endorsement effect of
the union. Hence voter’s preferences can be expresses as:

uv (q I ) + v I + aI 1{dg =1}

(2.3)

uv (q C ) + v C + aC 1{dg =−1}
15

My model abstracts from the fact that unions can have a positive impact on welfare by affecting the
quality of local goods and services.
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where aC and aI measure the “muscle" effect of the endorsement.
b) v = v C − v I is a continuous random variable with full support and distribution denoted
by F (·).
For simplicity I assume that the utility function is the same for all voters.16
Politicians care about voters, but they also need to win elections. Since the union can
affect the electoral outcome, politicians care about unions. I model the objective function
of a politician as a weighted average of voters’ preferences and union preferences. Some
politicians are more “pro-union" than others. I capture this heterogeneity by assuming that
politicians differ in the weight that they place on union preferences.
Assumption 4
a) A politician has a utility function that is given by:

(1 − θ) up (q) + θ up (T )

(2.4)

where θ ∈ [0, 1] is drawn from distribution G(·).
b) For each value of θ there exists a unique maximizer of the politician’s utility, denoted by
T0 (θ), where T0 (θ) is strictly increasing in θ.17

2.2.2

Timeline, Information, Strategies, and Equilibrium

I model the game between voters, the union, and the two politicians as a sequential game
in extensive form with incomplete information. The timing of decisions is as follows:

16

All of my main results can be extended cases with voter heterogeneity over policies.
Assumption 4b implies that the function T0 is invertible, hence the politicians type is given by θ =
T0−1 (q) .
17
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1. The challenger type is drawn form the distribution G(θ).
2. The type is known to the union, but unknown to the voters.
3. The union decides whether or not to endorse one of the politicians.
4. The voters observe the endorsement and update their beliefs.
5. Voters elect one of the two politicians as the mayor of the city.
6. The mayor implements his or her preferred policy.
Figure B.1 provides an illustration of the tree of this game in extensive form.
A pure strategy for the union is a mapping from the type space of challengers, denoted
by Θ = [0, 1], into the endorsement space, E = {1, 0, −1}.
A pure strategy for each voter is a mapping from the endorsement space E = {1, 0, −1}
into the voting space, V = {1, −1}. Since there are only two candidates, sincere voting is a
dominant strategy for each voter.
A pure strategy for a politician is mapping from Θ into the transfer space. As I have
discussed above, a politician cannot commit to a policy or a transfer to the union prior to
the election. Hence, the dominant strategy of a politician is to implement T0 (θ) after the
election.
The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in pure strategies.
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2.2.3

Equilibrium

For given value of θI , the equilibrium strategy of the union can be characterized by a
partition of Θ denoted by {Θ1 , Θ0 , Θ−1 } such that

dg =










1 : θC ∈ Θ1

0 : θC ∈ Θ0






 −1 : θC ∈ Θ−1

(2.5)

Given this strategy, voters will update their beliefs about the challenger according to Bayes’
Rule.18 The incumbent’s probability of winning the election conditional on the endorsement
strategy is, therefore, given by:

C
I
S1 = F (uIv − E[uC
v | θ ∈ Θ1 ] + a )
C
S0 = F (uIv − E[uC
v | θ ∈ Θ0 ])

(2.6)

C
C
S−1 = F (uIv − E[uC
v | θ ∈ Θ−1 ] − a )

The expected utility of the union is then:

I
π1 = S1 uIg + (1 − S1 ) uC
g −c

π0 = S0 uIg + (1 − S0 ) uC
g

(2.7)

C
π−1 = S−1 uIg + (1 − S−1 ) uC
g −c

Proposition 1 provides conditions that guarantee an equilibrium exists, with all three
18

Here I implicitly assume that all Θj are not empty. I consider the case of corner solutions below.
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actions dg = {1, 0, −1} arising as equilibrium outcomes:
Proposition 1 Define the strategy of the union as:

dg =

















1

:

θC < K1 (θI )

0

:

θC ∈ [K1 (θI ), K2 (θI )]

−1

:

θC > K2 (θI )

with 0 ≤ K1 (θI ) ≤ θI ≤ K2 (θI ) ≤ 1. K1 (θI ) and K2 (θI ) are the solution to the following
two equations:

I
0.95T0−1 {u−1
g (ug −

cI
)} = K1
C
I
I
C
C
F (uIv − E[uC
v | θ < K1 ] + a ) − F (uv − E[uv | θ ∈ [K1 , K2 ]])

I
0.95T0−1 {u−1
g (ug +

cC
)} = K2
C
I
C
C
C
F (uIv − E[uC
v | θ ∈ [K1 , K2 ]]) − F (uv − E[uv | θ > K2 ] − a )

This strategy is an equilibrium strategy if the advertisement effect is sufficiently strong, i.e.
if aI and ac satisfy:

C
I
C
C
I
I
I
E[uC
v | θ < K1 (θ )] − E[uv | θ ∈ [K1 (θ ), K2 (θ )]] < a
C
I
I
C
C
I
C
E[uC
v | θ ∈ [K1 (θ ), K2 (θ )]] − E[uv | θ > K2 (θ )] < a

A proof of Proposition 1 is provided in Appendix A.
Broadly speaking, Proposition 1 shows that the union endorsement has two effects in
equilibrium. First, it directly increases the probability of winning of the endorsed candidate.
I denote this as the “muscle effect." In practice, the union can accomplish this by mobilizing
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its members and increasing turnout of pro-union voters, a strategy also known as “mobilizing
the base." Moreover, local unions sometimes provide staffing or administrative support for
campaigns of politicians that are endorsed.19
Second, the endorsement conveys information to uninformed voters about the position
of the challenger. I denote this effect as the “informational externality." In my model,
the informational externality is purely negative, harming the politician that receives the
endorsement. It is not difficult to extend my model in which I have a second type of voter
for whom the union endorsement is a positive informational externality. I can view the
second type of voter as ideological assuming that this type only turns out for an election if
the union explicitly tells him to do so.
A necessary condition for the existence of an equilibrium with endorsement is that the
positive “muscle effect" is larger than than the negative “informational externality." This
condition is not sufficient to generate an endorsement if the difference in positions between
politicians is small or if the endorsement costs are large.
Proposition 1 assumes an interior solution for the thresholds that characterize the union’s
strategy, i.e. K1 , K2 ∈ (0, 1). I can extend the result in Proposition 1 and consider three
special cases that arise when the solution to the system of equations that defines the thresholds has, at least, one corner solution. The first case arises when K1 ≤ 0, K2 ∈ (0, 1). In
this case, {θC : θC < K1 } = ∅, so dg = 1 will never be selected in equilibrium. To guarantee
that dg = 1 is not a profitable deviation, I need to specify voters’ belief off the equilibrium
path, i.e. specify beliefs about θC when dg = 1 is played off the equilibrium path.
Assumption 5 If Θ1 = ∅ and voters observe dg = 1, they believe that θC = 0
19

I mainly abstract from campaign contributions which play a much larger role in state and federal
elections.
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C
C
Assumption 5 then implies that E(uC
v | dg = 1) = E(uv | θ = 0). The probabilities of

winning the election are now given by:

C
I
S1 = F (uIv − E[uC
v | θ = 0] + a )
C
I
S0 = F (uIv − E[uC
v | θ ∈ [0, K2 (θ )]])

(2.8)

C
I
C
S−1 = F (uIv − E[uC
v | θ ∈ (K2 (θ ), 1]] − a )

A corner solution arises if K1 (θI ) satisfies the following condition:

I
K1 = T0−1 {u−1
g (ug −

cI
)} ≤ 0
C
I
I
C
C
F (uIv − E[uC
v | θ = 0] + a ) − F (uv − E[uv | θ ∈ [0, K2 ]])

The equilibrium strategy of the union in this case is is given by:

dg =






0 : θC ∈ [0, K2 (θI )]
(2.9)



 −1 : θC ∈ (K2 (θI ), 1]
The second case arises when K1 ∈ (0, 1), K2 ≥ 1. Similar to the first case, I need to
specify voters’ beliefs about θC when dg = −1 is taken.
Assumption 6 If Θ−1 = ∅ and voters observe dg = −1, they believe that θC = 1.
C
C
Assumption 6 implies that E(uC
v | dg = −1) = E(uv | θ = 1). Again define:

C
I
I
S1 = F (uIv − E[uC
v | θ ∈ [0, K1 (θ ))] + a )
C
I
S0 = F (uIv − E[uC
v | θ ∈ [K1 (θ ), 1]])
C
C
S−1 = F (uIv − E[uC
v | θ = 1] − a )
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(2.10)

Let K2 (θI ) satisfies the following equation:

I
K2 = T0−1 {u−1
g (ug +

cC
)≥1
C
I
C
C
C
F (uIv − E[uC
v | θ ∈ [K1 , 1]]) − F (uv − E[uv | θ = 1] − a )

while K1 ∈ (0, 1). The equilibrium strategy of the union is given by:

dg =




 1 : θC ∈ [0, K1 (θI ))

(2.11)



 0 : θC ∈ [K1 (θI ), 1]
The last case arises when K1 ≤ 0, andK2 ≥ 1. Specifying off-equilibrium beliefs as
before, I obtain the following probabilities:

C
I
S1 = F (uIv − E[uC
v | θ = 0] + a )
C
S0 = F (uIv − E[uC
v | θ ∈ [0, 1]])

(2.12)

C
C
S−1 = F (uIv − E[uC
v | θ = 1] − a )

The equilibrium strategy of the union is then given by:


dg =

0 : θC ∈ [0, 1]

(2.13)

To illustrate the main results of Proposition 1, I consider a fully parametrized numerical
example of my model.20 The optimal strategy of the union is plotted in Figure B.2. The
two axes denote the type of the incumbent and the type of the challenger. The lines in
the plot denote the cut-off levels, K1 and K2 that characterize the optimal strategy of the
20

Details about my parameterization and calibration are available upon request from the authors.
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union. The 45 degree line satisfies θI = θC and falls between the two cutoff values K1 and
K2 . There are three subsets of the underlying type space that deserve special attention.
Subset 1 is the set of θI in which only dg ∈ {0, −1} arise as equilibrium outcomes. Subset
2 is the set of θI in which dg ∈ {1, 0, −1} arise in outcomes. Subset 3 is the set of θI with
only dg ∈ {0, 1} are chosen in equilibrium.
I have also performed some comparative static exercises. First, I investigate how the
optimal strategy varies as I decrease the endorsement costs. I find that for every value of
θI the region of θC with no endorsement decreases. The cheaper the endorsement is, the
more active is the union. Second, I decrease the muscle effect. I find that for every value of
θI , the region for θC with no endorsement increases. The intuition is that the lower muscle
effect makes it harder to offset the negative signaling externality of the endorsement. Hence
the union is less active.
I can also show that the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 1 is unique in the
following sense.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium characterized in Proposition 1 is the only equilibrium with
all three actions dg = {1, 0, −1} being used as part of the union’s equilibrium strategy.
A proof of Proposition 2 is provided in Appendix A.
Equilibrium imposes strong restrictions on the change in public policy after an election.
Consider the case in which the union endorses the challenger, and the challenger defeats the
incumbent in the election. In that case, my model predicts an increase in the transfer to
the public sector following the election. Similarly, if the union endorses the incumbent, and
the challenger wins the election, the model predicts a decrease in the transfer to the union.
I expect only small policy changes if nobody is endorsed. If an incumbent is reelected, the
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size of the transfer does not change. Proposition 3 formalizes this result.21
Proposition 3
a) If dg = 1 and the challenger wins then ∆T < 0
b) If dg = −1 and the challenger wins then ∆T > 0
c) If dg = 0 and the challenger wins then |∆T | ≤ 
A proof of Proposition 3 is provided in Appendix A.

2.3

Data

My empirical analysis focuses on the most populous cities in the U.S., as classified by the
2010 U.S. Census.22 For each city, I focus on elections that were held between 1990 and
2012. In my sample, 10.87 percent of all cities are located in the east, 34.78 percent in the
west, 35.87 in the south, and 18.48 in the midwest. Cities can be classified into two types.
First, there are partisan cities that require political candidates to enter a race with a party
affiliation. Partisan elections are only held in 15.22 percent of all cities in the sample. The
vast majority of cities are thus non-partisan. In these cities, candidates are not allowed
or are not obligated to run with a party affiliation.23 In some non-partisan elections, it is
common knowledge which candidates are members of and backed by which parties. In other
elections, parties are not involved.24
21

Here I only consider the case of an interior solution. The corner solution cases can be analyzed using a
similar logic.
22
As explained in detail below, my sample consists of 92 out of the 150 largest cities in the U.S.
23
Nonpartisan elections are generally held for school boards, and are also common in the election of
judges.
24
In 1915, A.C. Townley founded the Nonpartisan League in North Dakota as s backlash against partisan
politics. This movement quickly spread across the Midwest and attracted much attention in large cities.
More recently, Proposition 14 in California mandated that all elections for municipal offices in California
have to be nonpartisan. It was approved by 54 percent of the voters in 2010.
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There are two different types of elections that occur during our sample period: general
elections and run-off elections. General elections have potentially more than two candidates.
If the general election does not determine a winner, a run-off election is held between the
two candidates that received the most votes in a general election, but failed to obtain an
absolute majority of the votes. For partisan cities, I study Democratic and Republican
primaries. For each election type I construct a list of candidates as well as information
on vote shares, partisanship, and incumbency status. I have obtained the election data
from two different data sources. First, I called the city registrar in each city and asked for
historical election data. Second, I cross-checked the information with data from a website
called Ourcampaigns.25
I constructed mayoral histories for each city going back to the 1980’s. Based on this
historical data, I can then classify cities into two types: cities that were primarily controlled
by one party during the observed history and cities that are more competitive and have
mayors from different parties. In my sample, the fraction of cities that are controlled by one
party since 1990 (1980) is 27.17 (21.74) percent.
I also collected data characterizing differences in political institutions. Most cities impose
some sort of term limit. In many cities mayors can only be elected for two successive periods.
I find that 89.13 percent of all cities have term limits for mayors. I also characterize the
strength of the office of the mayor. I consider the position of a mayor as strong if he is directly
elected by majority rule and if he is at the same time the head of the administration, i.e.
if there is no professional city manger at the top of the city administration. In my sample,
63.04 percent of all cities have strong mayors.
25

The web site is http://www.ourcampaigns.com/ Ourcampaigns is a large electronic community with
8, 674 registered members and contains detailed information on 267, 420 political races.
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I have obtained endorsement data from two different data sources. First, I called the
different municipal unions in each city. This approach was time consuming and did not yield
in a high response rate. Second, I relied on local newspaper coverage to measure endorsements. I utilize an electronic database called “Newsbank" that contains rich, searchable,
full-text of international, national, regional, and local newspapers. I assign a newspaper to
a city if the newspaper has the city’s name in the title or if the newspaper serves the county
and surrounding counties with headquarters in the city.
I consider three types of public sector unions: police unions (such as local chapters of
the Fraternal Order of Police or the Police Officers’ Association), firefighters’ unions (such
as local chapters of the Fraternal Order of Firefighters and the International Association of
Firefighters) and teachers’ unions (such as local chapters of American Federation of Teachers
and National Education Association). If there are multiple unions in a city I aggregate
unions of the same type and treat these as one union.26 I focus on police, firefighters and
teachers because these occupations have a long established tradition of unionization and
are well organized in almost all cities. For instance, the Fraternal Order of Police, founded
in 1915, has over 325, 000 members organized in 2, 100 local chapters. The International
Association of Firefighters, founded in 1918, has 298, 000 members in more than 3, 200 locals.
the American Federation of Teachers, founded in 1916, has 1.1 million members in around
600 locals.27 Police officers (firefighters/teachers) account on average for 16.61 (11.02/33.77)
percent of public sector employment in my sample as well as 20.64 (13.92/38.36) percent of

26

In addition, I also collected data on city employee’s unions such as local chapters of American Federation
of State, County and Municipal Employees and local chapters of Services Employees International Union.
27
It is noteworthy that only 11 out of 92 cities in my sample have positive expenditures on elementary and
secondary school teachers’ payrolls. School districts are typically independent from municipal governments.
I include teacher union activities for those 11 cities only as my theory predicts that a union participates in
an elections to obtain transfers from the local government.
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the payroll.
For each candidate, I search the local newspapers in the election year using the following
key words:
• police + candidate name + city name + mayoral election + endorsement
• firefighter + candidate name + city name + mayoral election + endorsement
• teacher + candidate name + city name + mayoral election + endorsement
The database returns the articles with specific key words. I read each article to identify
whether a public sector union endorsed a candidate. Since it is hard to determine at which
stage of the election process the endorsement comes, I treat each endorsement as an endorsement for the entire length of the mayoral election.
Transfers to public unions and its members are not directly observed int he data. Instead,
I focus on outcomes that are closely related to potential transfers. I obtain data on public
sector employment and payrolls by functions from the Annual Survey of Public Employment
and Payroll collected by the U.S. Census Bureau.28 I use full-time equivalent employees to
measure employment. I adjust the payroll data by the Consumer Price Index - All Urban
Consumers, published by Bureau of Labor Statistics. The base period is 1982-84. I normalize
the public sector size and total payrolls by the city population. I interpolate the missing
values.29
To construct the sample used in the empirical analysis, I start with the 150 most populous
cities based on 2010 U.S. Census. First, I exclude Cincinnati and all cities in Arizona.
Cincinnati adopts a different election system from my model: they elect six council members
28
29

http://www.census.gov/govs/apes/
An appendix is available upon request which provides details.
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at one election, and the top candidate automatically becomes mayor. In Arizona, state law
forbids local unions to participate in political activities in regions where they have a member.
Therefore, local unions cannot make endorsement decisions as described in my model. Hence,
the sample size shrinks to 141 cities. I managed to assemble election results for 723 elections
in 124 cities.
The second step is to find police union, firefighter union and teacher union endorsements
from local newspapers and phone conversations. That step reduces the sample to 97 cities
and 499 elections. In the third step, I only keep elections with an incumbent and, at least, one
challenger reducing the sample to 92 cities and 299 elections, including 294 general elections,
60 runoff elections, 9 Republican primaries, and 24 Democratic primaries. In the fourth step,
I restrict my sample to elections with full public sector data reducing the sample to 92 cities
and 292 elections, with 287 general elections, 59 runoff elections, 9 Republican primaries
and 24 Democratic primary elections. Finally, I keep only elections with full turnout data.
I delete one general election, and the rest remain the same. Table B.1 provides summary
statistics for the sample used in the subsequent analysis.

2.4

Empirical Results

I investigate the impact of union endorsements on election outcomes. From the perspective
of my theoretical analysis, the main outcome of interest is the probability that the incumbent is reelected. However, there is separate interest in the vote share of the incumbent
which provides a continuous measure of the electoral success of the incumbent. In addition
I consider the impact of endorsements on voter-turnout. This outcome measures how effectively a union can mobilize its base. Finally, I consider the impact of union endorsements
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on urban fiscal policy outcomes that capture the “transfers" generated by the union. Here
I focus on salaries of unionized employees as well as employment levels.30

2.4.1

The Impact of Unions on Elections

I can classify elections by observed endorsement status. Table B.2 summarizes the election
path that mimics my game. I find that there is a strong incumbency advantage. Incumbents
won 35 of 41 elections in which they received endorsements. Incumbents won 181 out 200
elections without endorsements and 24 out of 44 elections with endorsements of the challengers.31 The mean of margin of victory is 39.99 percent in elections with no endorsements,
33.44 percent if the incumbent is endorsed, and 16.47 if the challenger is endorsed.
My model predicts that the effect of an endorsement on the endorsed politician’s probability of winning the election should be positive, but potentially small. If the union endorses
the incumbent, the muscle effect increases the incumbent’s vote share while the signaling
externality decreases the vote share. To test these predictions, I estimate Logit models to
quantify the impact of an endorsement on the winning probability of the incumbent. My
model specifications control for the full vector of observed heterogeneity among cities which
includes geographic dummy variables, as well as variables capturing partisanship, one-party
control, term limits, and mayoral strength. Table B.3 shows the results of my maximum
likelihood estimates. I distinguish between general elections, run-off-elections and key elections. The key election can be a primary, a general or a run-off election. I use the one with
the highest turn-out.
Table B.3 shows that the endorsement has no significant effect for incumbents. That is
30
I do not have reliable measures of total compensation or benefits. Moreover, I am lacking data that
characterize work rules or hiring and firing practices.
31
There are 14 elections with multiple endorsements.

71

not surprising since most incumbents are safe and are reelected with wide margins of victory.
I find that challengers benefit much more from an endorsement than incumbents. Moreover,
the effect on the incumbent’s reelection probability is not only negative (as predicted by my
model) and statistically significant different from zero, but the effect is large in magnitude.
My estimates that the probability of winning reelection is reduced by 22 to 41 percentage
points if the challenger receives an endorsement.
It is important to recognize that this part of the analysis suffers from a potential endogeneity problem. Unions may decide to endorse candidates for reasons that have not been
modeled thus far. For example, it is possible that candidates differ in quality or “valor,"
which is observed by the union, but unobserved by the econometrician. In that case a
union may decide to endorse the higher quality candidate who is also more likely to win
the election. In particular, challengers that receive the endorsement of the union may be
better candidates. While it is not difficult to extend my theoretical model to account for
differences in quality among politicians, it is more challenging to deal with these issues empirically, given that there are no obvious instruments. Alternatively, unions may have a
preference for “winners" since they need to deal with successful politicians. While this is
another plausible explanation for potential endogeneity, it seems to be less of an issue in
my application. I observe, for example, that the vast majority of incumbents do not receive
union endorsements despite the fact they are reelected with almost 90 percent probability.
The vote share of the incumbent provides an alternative measure of the electoral success
of the incumbent. This measure has the advantage that it is continuous. As a consequence,
I also regress the vote share of the incumbent on union endorsement controlling for observed
and unobserved city characteristics. Table B.4 summarizes the main results. Note that
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the base category is that nobody is endorsed. The city characteristics include geographic
locations, whether to hold partisan elections, single party in power, term limit, and whether
strong mayor. Overall, the findings are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the results
that are based on the Logit models. There is a large negative effect on the incumbent’s vote
share if a union endorses the challenger or if both candidates receive endorsements.32
Next I consider the impact of union endorsement on election turn-out. A union can
influence the outcome of a local election by mobilizing its base including union members as
well as friends and family of members. I, therefore, investigate whether there is a systematic
relationship between election turnout and union endorsement.
Table B.5 summarizes the main results. Overall, I find some evidence that suggests
that union endorsements increase voter turn-out. This finding is true for endorsements of
incumbents as well as challengers. The effect is larger if a challenger is endorsed and in key
elections.

2.4.2

The Impact of Unions on Urban Fiscal Policy

Recall that Proposition 3 predicts that transfers to the union increase if the challenger is
endorsed by the union and the challenger defeats the incumbent. I can test this prediction
using a difference-in-difference estimation strategy. Let yit denote the outcome of interest
that captures transfers to unions. Consider the following regression model:

yit = αi + αt +

S
X

C
γ1s Lit−s Eit−s
+ it

(2.14)

s=1

32

Key elections are defined as party primary elections for cities with single party in power since 1990,
and the type of election with highest voter turnout rate otherwise.

73

where Lit is a dummy that is equal to one of the incumbent lost the election at time t and
zero otherwise. EitC is one if the challenger received a union endorsement in the election at
time t and zero otherwise. I include lagged variables to account for possible adjustment costs,
since it may take some time for a new administration to implement changes in fiscal policy.
This identification strategy accounts for time-invariant unobserved city characteristics and
aggregate shocks. I do not include a contemporaneous effect since municipal elections are
typically held at the end of the calendar year.
Broadly speaking, my model implies that the public sector should grow whenever the
newly elected mayor is likely to be more “pro-union" than the incumbent that lost the
election. Table B.6 shows the results of my estimations for the full sample. All coefficients
reported in Table B.6 are predicted to be positive.33 I find that this is case. However, only a
small subset of all coefficients are statistically significantly different from zero. I, therefore,
conclude that there is some evidence that suggests that challengers that are endorsed by the
union tend to increase spending and or salaries if they manage to defeat an incumbent.
Proposition 3 also predicts that spending and payrolls should decrease, if the union
endorses the incumbent and the challenger wins. The corresponding regression model is
given by

yit = αi + αt +

S
X

I
γ2s Lit−s Eit−s
+ it

(2.15)

s=1

where Lit is a dummy that is equal to one of the incumbent lost the election at time t and
zero otherwise. EitI is one if the incumbent received a union endorsement in the election at
33

Observations with no fire sector or police sector are excluded from respective regressions. Size per
capita is increased by 10000.
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time t and zero otherwise. All coefficients γ2s are predicted to be negative. When I estimate
this regression I find no evidence that supports my model. In particular, the estimates of γ2s
are insignificant and have both positive and negative signs. This finding is consistent with
the view that it is hard to downsize the public sector in the short run. Existing contractual
agreements make it virtually impossible to cut salaries. Moreover, reductions in employment
can only be achieved by not filling openings that arise due to voluntary attrition.

2.5

Summary

The efficient decentralized provision of public goods requires that special interest groups do
not exercise undue influence on the outcome of municipal elections or local fiscal policies. I
have developed a new political economy model in which an incumbent faces a challenger in
a local election. A union can endorse one of the candidates and provide political support.
I have shown that there is an inherent conflict faced by the municipal union. While union
support increases the chances of winning the election because the union can mobilize its
members, the endorsement also generates a negative informational externality. Voters observe the endorsement and update their beliefs about the position of the challenger. Theory
also predicts that unions can have a significant impact on fiscal policies by shifting policies
away from the preferred policies of the voters and, thus, potentially creating inefficiencies
in local public good provision and in the aggregate economy. I have tested the predictions
of my model using a novel data set that focuses on municipal elections in the largest cities
in the U.S. between 1990 and 2012. I have shown that challengers strongly benefit from
endorsements in competitive elections. Challengers that receive union endorsements and
successfully defeat an incumbent also tend to adopt more union friendly fiscal policies.
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I view the findings of this paper as promising for future research. An interesting extension would be to study open elections in which there are no established incumbents. One
drawback of studying open elections is that theory does not easily provide clear predictions
about the sign and magnitude of the change in policy that I would expect after the election.
It is, for example, possible that a unions may endorse a candidate in an open election that
is less supportive of the union than the previous incumbent.34 Another promising line of research is to consider the following two-period extension of my model. In the first period there
is an open election without an incumbent. In the second period, the incumbent runs against
a new challenger. I can view the analysis in this paper as pertaining to the sub-game that
arises in the second period. The extended model then endogenizes the incumbency status
and allows voters to (potentially) punish first round winners that adopt unpopular policies.
While it is compelling to pursue this idea, extending the model to a multi-period environment is not trivial. A key problem is that the strategy spaces of politicians, unions and
voters are more complicated which makes it much harder to characterize an equilibrium of
the game.

34

Another interesting idea for future research is to examine if teacher unions endorse union-friendly
candidates in school board elections.
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Appendix A

Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1

Sample Selection

The first wave of the AJD contains 3905 valid responses from the nationally representative sample.
The second wave of AJD contains 3705 valid responses. Both waves ask about the details of current
job (including sectors, salary, working hours, starting date, etc), education background, and some
personal characteristics. The second wave records the details of job history, including sector, starting
date, ending date, etc. The first wave also asks about the job history, but only records starting year
and ending year.
Firstly, I construct the full-time job histories of respondents. The starting points are the selfretrospective histories in wave II. I reasonably impute the job characteristics (i.e. starting dates,
ending dates, sector classifications) to make job histories consistent. For some respondents who
report the starting year of the earliest job earlier than 2003, I use wave I information as a supplement.
I delete the individuals who only report job information of 2006 and the starting year of that job is
later than 2003.
Secondly, I impute class of 1999 as class of 2000. I am interested in the career choices for the
class of 2000, but they may either take bar exams in 2000, 2001, or later. The dataset provides
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information on the first-time bar exam takers in 2000. I assume students from class of 1999 who
take exams in 2000 are approximately the same as students from class of 2000 who take exams in
2001. As the majority of students (93.75% of students in the sample graduate in 1999 or 2000) take
their first bar exams within two years, I drop individuals who do otherwise.
Thirdly, I bundle the monthly job choices into annual job choices. I derive a method based on
Keane and Wolpin (1997). For each year since 2001, I calculate the number of months the respondent
is not working. If that number is greater than four, I treat him as not employed. If that number is
less than four, I compare the sector in which he has worked for the longest time, and assign it as
his job for the year. If the job has a missing sector classification for the longest spell, I treat the
individual as employed for the year, but with missing information on employment. Note that I focus
on full-time jobs in this research, so a spell with only part-time jobs is considered as not employed.
Fourthly, I impute the undergraduate GPA using law school GPA, law school tiers, gender, race,
debt, gender, age, and graduation year for those undergraduate GPA are missing. I do this for the
747 individuals who had missing undergraduate GPA scores in my final sample.
Fifthly, I gather information on judicial clerks from Official Guide to Law Schools1 . Judicial
clerks are temporary jobs that are usually taken right after J.D. graduation. Typically the job lasts
for one or two years. AJD only solicits job information excluding judicial clerks. So I rely on OG
to calculate the proportion of judicial clerkship placements by each tier of schools. The judicial
clerkship accounts for 17%, 10%, 9% and 6% for Tier 1, 2, 3 and 4 schools.
Table A.1 shows the statistics of sample selection process.

A.2

Robustness Check of Empirical Facts

Fact 1 Females with more debt have more work experience in private law firms.

Table A.2 reports the results of linear regressions with experience in private law firms, in pub1

Published by the American Bar Association.
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Table A.1: Sample Selection
Full Sample
With info on debt upon graduation
Take first bar exam in 2000
Class of 1999 or 2000
With info on law school tiers
With info on gender
With info on dates of at least one job
With complete job histories
Female

Obs
5349
4935
4658
4367
4219
4211
2931
2366
1193

lic/business sector, or of being not employed as of 2007 as dependent variables, and debt as an
explanatory variable. The expected experience with mean debt level ($85,200) is 2.99, 2.26, 1.73
years 2 . An increase of $10,000 debt upon graduation is associated with 0.06 years more in private
law firms and 0.04 years less being not employed. One standard deviation ($58,300) more debt upon
graduation is therefore associated with 12.5 percent increase in private law firms experience and
16.53 percent decrease in years of not employed.
Table A.3 reports the results of multinomial logistic regressions with dependent variables as the
probabilities of each alternative in each of the year 2003-2007. All the reported estimates are the
marginal effects of $1000 more debt on the choice probabilities of each of the three sectors evaluated
at the mean3 . The magnitudes are similar to that in previous specifications measured by percent
changes. The relationships are strong and significant almost over the entire span.
Overall speaking, debt is strongly related to the sector choices of females, and the relationship
persists at least seven years after graduation.

Fact 2 Females with more debt are more likely to postpone marriage.

Table A.4 reports the results of survival analysis with dependent variables as hazards of getting
married. The regressions are meant to describe whether debt is related to the timing of marriages.
The baseline hazard (at the mean level of debt) is around 54 percentage points. Specification (1) in
2
3

I include judicial clerk experience as being not employed, as the surveys do not differentiate these two.
The average marginal effects are similar in magnitude and significance levels.
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Table A.2: Debt and Working Experience 7 Years After Graduation
Debt upon Graduation
(in 2014 $1,000)
Observations

Private
6.25∗∗∗
(4.15)
1089

Public/Business
-1.91
(-1.31)
1089

Not Employed
-4.34∗∗∗
(-3.81)
1089

t statistics in parentheses
a

b
c

Control variables: undergraduate gpa, age, school tier, year of bar admission, whether a parent is a lawyer, parents’ education, race.
All estimates are in 10−3 .
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A.3: Debt and Career Choices: 2003-2007
Year
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
a

b
c

d

Private Law Firms
0.84**
0.69**
1.17***
0.87***
1.12***

Public/Business
-0.42
-0.04
-0.44
-0.16
-0.23

Not Employed
-0.41*
-0.65***
-0.74***
-0.71***
-0.89***

Reports the marginal effects in choice probability of each sector
through year-by-year multinomial logistic regressions. The explanatory variable is student debt upon graduation measured in
2014 $1000.
All estimates are in 10−3 .
Control variables: undergraduate gpa, age, school tier, year of bar
admission, whether a parent is a lawyer, parents’ education, race.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.4 shows a 0.057 percentage point decrease in the probability of getting married in the next
three years conditional on being single, given $1000 more debt upon graduation. One more standard
deviation of debt ($58,300) would decrease the probability by 3.32 percentage points, or 6.1 percent
of the baseline. Specification (2) uses the remaining amount of debt as the explanatory variable
and reaches similar estimates. One alternative mechanism is that those with more debt are more
likely to work in private law firms, and long hours reduce their social life. To isolate such possible
effects of labor market choices on marriage outcomes, I conduct two robustness tests by including
the sector specific work experience. The results remain largely the same, as shown in specification
(3) and (4).

Table A.4: Debt and Marriage Rates

Debt upon Graduation
(in 2014 $1000)
Remaining Debt
(in 2014 $1000)
Sector-Specific Work Exp
Observations

(1)
-0.057∗∗
(-2.49)

1622

Being Married
(2)
(3)
-0.049∗∗
(-2.16)
-0.067∗∗∗
(-2.64)
yes
1607
1622

(4)

-0.063∗∗
(-2.49)
yes
1607

t statistics in parentheses
a

Conditional log-log models for discrete time proportional hazard, time is bundled in 2 periods, each period corresponds to 3 years.
c
Reports the marginal effects on Probability of (Event happens in current
period given it has not happened before) evaluated at mean. Average marginal
effects are similar.
d
Clusters by individual, Control variables: undergraduate gpa, age, school
tier, year of bar admission, whether a parent is a lawyer, parents’ education,
race.
e
In data, only marital status in 2003 and 2006 are observed.
f
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Fact 3 Spouses of females with more debt have lower earnings.

Table A.5 reports the Tobit regression results with dependent variables as accepted spousal earnings
for the year 2006, and the explanatory variable as debt upon graduation. As shown in specification
(1), with one more dollar of debt, the accepted salary of the spouse decreases by 16 cents. One
alternative mechanism is that those with more debt are more likely to work in private law firms,
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and long hours prevent them from finding and dating high-earning spouses. To isolate this possible
effect of labor market choices on marriage outcomes, I conduct two robustness tests. In the first test
shown in specification (2), I control for the work experience in each sector as of 2005. In the second
test shown in specification (3), I control for the working hours reported for 2006. The estimates do
not change much.4

Table A.5: Debt and Spousal Salary of Year 2006

Debt upon Graduation
Sector-Specific Work Exp by 2005
Work Hours in 2006
Observations

Accepted Spousal Salary
(1)
(2)
(3)
-0.157∗∗ -0.125∗ -0.128∗
(-2.20)
(-1.75) (-1.83)
yes
yes
723
723
723

t statistics in parentheses
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
a

Control variables: undergraduate gpa, age, school tier, year of bar admission, whether a parent is a lawyer, parents’ education, race

Fact 4 Females with more debt are more likely to postpone childbearing.

Table A.6 reports the results of survival analysis with the dependent variable as the hazard of having
a child. The average hazard in the data is 8.7 percentage points. Specification (1) in Table A.4 shows
a 0.004 percentage point decrease in probability of having a child in the next year conditional on
having no children, given $1000 more debt upon graduation. One more standard deviation of debt
($ 58,300) would decrease the probability by 0.23 percentage points, or 2.6 percent relative to the
sample average. The estimate is not statistically significant, though. Specification (2) includes
marital status. Results suggest that married individuals are substantially more likely to have a child
than singles, with the marginal effect as large as 8.9 percentage points. It also reduces the magnitude
of the coefficient of debt.

4
Ideally, I should include the working hours and working experiences immediately before marriages, and
should use spousal earnings upon marriages as the dependent variable. Unfortunately in the data I do not
observe the exact date of marriages or the spouse’s earnings in every period.
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Table A.6: Debt and Childbearing

Debt upon Graduation
(in 2014 $1000)
Being Married
Observations

Having a Child
(1)
(2)
-0.004
-0.002
(-0.88) (-0.66)
8.90∗∗∗
(16.73)
7013
6061

t statistics in parentheses
a

Conditional log-log models for discrete time
proportional hazard, time is bundled in 7 periods, each period corresponds to 1 year.
c
Reports the marginal effects on Probability of
(Event happens in current period given it has not
happened before) evaluated at mean. Average
marginal effects are similar.
d
Clusters by individual, Control variables: undergraduate gpa, age, school tier, year of bar admission, whether a parent is a lawyer, parents’
education, race.
e
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

A.3

Exact Functional Forms

This appendix lists the exact functional forms not shown in the main text.

A.3.1

Arrival Rates of Children

The arrival rates of children are specified as follows in the post-graduation stage,

P r(Has a newborn child at period t) = (β1K At + β2K A2t )mt + β3K (1 − mt )

(A.1)

and in the schooling stage,

P r(Has a newborn child at period t) = (

J
X

K
β0j
Sj + β1K At + β2K A2t )mt + β3K (1 − mt )

j=1
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(A.2)

A.3.2

Job Offer Distribution

The vector of initial job offer probabilities for school j graduates is specified as

PjI = {β1I , 0, β3I , 1, β5I } × θj

(A.3)

for the five alternatives, where βlI ×θj denotes the probability of receiving an offer to work in position
l immediately after graduation from law school j. θj captures the school differences in initial job
arrival rates.
Each job offer is two dimensional, consisting of salary and working hours requirement. Job offer
in position l = 1, 2, 3 at year t is specified as

ln(Wlt )

=

J
X

W
W
W
W
W
β1jl
Sj + β2l
GP A + β3l
LSAT + β4l
XtR + β5l
XtP + εW
lt

(A.4)

j=1

ln(Hlt )

H
H
= β0l
+ β1l
(XtR + XtP ) + εH
lt

(A.5)

where XtR denotes the working experience in private law firms, and XtP denotes the working experience in public/business sector,

XtR

=

t−1
X

(O1s + O2s )

(A.6)

O3s

(A.7)

s=1

XtP

=

t−1
X
s=1

The two distributions are independent from each other and serially uncorrelated. Income and hours
in position l = 4, 5 are specified as parameters β4W and β4H .

84

A.3.3

Preference in the Schooling Stage

The flow utility function is specified as follows:

Ujt =

A.3.4





ζ1 + ζ5 LSAT + ζ6 LSAT 2 + ζ7 LSAT + ζ8 LSAT 2 + ζ9 E + εS1t




ζj + εSjt






 εS4t

if j = 1
if j = 2, 3

(A.8)

if j = 4

Initial Conditions

The moments come from a combination of two datasets, AJD and NPSAS. The major challenge in
specifying initial conditions is that AJD does not have LSAT , and NPSAS does not have GP A.
I assume these two variables follow a truncated joint normal distribution and set their correlation
based on application profiles in dataset Law School Numbers.

A.4

Moments to Match

Age is divided into Nage = 2 categories, debt is divided into Ndebt = 2 categories, experience in
private law firms is divided into Nprivate = 2 categories, experience in public sector/business sector
is divided into Npublic = 2 categories, GPA is divided into NGP A = 4 categories, LSAT is divided
into NLSAT = 3 categories, spousal earnings is divided into Nspouse = 2 categories. There are
Nschool = 4 schools, Nposition = 3 positions (private associate, private partner, public/business),
Nsector = 2 sectors (private, public/business).
I compute the following 492 moments,
• Marital Status (24)
– Marital Status in 2003 and 2006, by school, age, debt and GPA: 2 × (Nschool + Nage +
Ndebt + NGP A ) = 24
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• Spouse Salary (9)
– Spouse Salary in 2006, by school, age, and debt: Nschool + Nage + Ndebt = 8
– Variance of spouse salary in 2006: 1
• Job Choices (270)
– Sector choice probabilities by years after graduation, school, experience, debt categories,
2006 marital status, 2006 kids status, GPA, spousal earnings: (Nposition + (Nposition −
1) × 3 + Nposition × 2) × (Nschool + Ndebt + Nprivate + 2 + 2 + NGP A + Nspouse ) =
(3 + 6 + 6) × (4 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 4 + 2) = 270
• Salary (76)
– Mean accepted salary in 2003 and 2006 by position×school, position×experience, position×GPA:
2 × Nposition × (Nschool + Nprivate + Npublic + NGP A ) = 72
– Variance of accepted salary in 2003 and 2006 by sector: 2 × Nsector = 4
• Hour (28)
– Mean accepted hours in 2003 and 2006 by position: 2 × Nposition × Nschool = 24
– Variance of accepted hours in 2003 and 2006 by sector: 2 × Nsector = 4
• Sector Transitions (48)
– Transition Probability (two-period) in 2003 and 2005 across sectors by school and debt:
2 × Nsector × Nsector × (Nschool + Ndebt ) = 2 × 2 × 2 × (4 + 2) = 48
• School Choices (37)
– Choice Probability of schools by GPA: (Nschool − 1) × NGP A = 12
– Choice Probability of schools by LSAT: (Nschool − 1) × NLSAT = 9
– Average LSAT in schools: Nschool = 4
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– Average family contribution in schools: Nschool = 4
– Average remaining college debt in schools:Nschool = 4
– Average debt upon graduation in schools: Nschool = 4

A.5

Estimates and Standard Errors
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Table A.7: Parameter Estimates and Standard Errors
Labor Market
W
W
β111
β121
2.25
−0.29
(0.02)
(0.03)
W
W
β112
β122
2.25
−0.29
(0.45)
(0.10)
W
W
β113
β123
1.85
−0.21
(0.01)
(0.03)
H
H
β01
β11
0.90
0.01
(0.02)
(0.00)
α01
α02
−24.00 −7.00
(1.55)
(0.76)
β1I
β3I
0.70
0.47
(0.03)
(0.03)

W
β131
−0.55
(0.06)
W
β132
−0.42
(0.36)
W
β133
−0.23
(0.06)
H
β02
0.90
(0.14)
α03
−7.00
(1.36)
β5I
0.47
(0.07)

Marriage Market
β0M
β1M
β2M
1.80
−0.04 −0.00
(0.12) (0.00) (0.00)

W
β141
−0.55
(0.05)
W
β142
−0.55
(0.26)
W
β143
−0.40
(0.07)
H
β03
0.85
(0.02)
α04
−10.40
(1.50)
θ2
0.85
(0.06)

β1B
−0.03
(0.00)

B
β31
1.85
(0.07)

Preference in the Post-Graduation
φ
µ1
µ2
µ3
0.70
1.50
0.01
0.08
(0.01) (0.31) (0.00) (0.06)
µ511
µ521
µ531
µ541
−6.26 −5.35 −3.11 −5.07
(0.26) (0.25) (0.34) (0.40)
µ513
µ523
µ533
µ543
−4.30 −4.10 −2.75 −4.70
(0.20) (0.15) (0.35) (0.19)
Learning
η01
η02
3.00
3.00
(0.33) (0.36)
η21
η22
18.00
9.00
(4.23) (0.31)

η03
6.00
(4.91)
η23
9.00
(0.69)

W
β21
0.04
(0.06)
W
β22
0.04
(0.06)
W
β23
0.01
(0.05)
σW
0.60
(0.21)
α1
0.40
0.52
θ3
0.78
(0.09)

η04
0.00
(0.00)
η24
1.00
(0.06)

Preference in the Schooling Stage
ζ1
ζ2
ζ3
ζ5
−59.00 46.50
37.70
0.10
(5.84)
(3.54) (1.39) (0.03)
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W
β31
0.00
(0.06)
W
β32
0.00
(0.06)
W
β33
0.00
(0.05)
σH
0.37
(0.013)
α2
0.02
0.02
θ4
0.64
(0.09)

B
β32
1.50
(0.07)

W
β41
0.10
(0.01)
W
β42
0.10
(0.04)
W
β43
0.06
(0.01)
β4W
30.00
(0.24)
α3
10.00
(0.13)

B
β33
1.40
(0.04)

W
β51
0.00
(0.00)
W
β52
0.00
(0.00)
W
β53
0.11
(0.00)
β4H
1.20
(0.12)
α4
−0.71
(0.07)

B
β34
1.25
(0.05)

σB
0.50
0.07

Stage
µ4
0.06
(0.02)
µ512
12.60
(2.63)

σO
0.01
(0.05)
µ522
7.80
(1.77)

σM
0.01
(0.06)
µ532
5.82
(2.14)

σJ
1.50
(0.39)
µ542
−1.50
(0.78)

η11
1.00
(0.02)

η12
1.00
(0.01)

η13
1.00
(0.03)

η14
1.00
(0.08)

ζ6
0.00
(0.00)

ζ7
0.01
(0.01)

ζ8
2.10
(0.49)

ζ9
0.10
(0.05)

A.6

External Evidence
Table A.8: Debt and Probability of Having Sleep Trouble
Explanatory Var: Debt upon Graduation, in 2014 $10,000
Dependent Var: Pr(# of Days with Sleep Issues Last Week > 1 )
Single Sample
Married Sample
Without Controls
0.001
0.006∗
(0.18)
(1.79)
With Controls
0.003
0.007∗∗
(0.68)
(1.98)
Average Prob
0.40
0.41
Logistic regressions with average marginal effects reported.
Controls: Job sectors, school tiers, age, race, undergraduate gpa.
Spousal income is also included for the married sample.
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Appendix B

Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1

Proofs

Proof of Proposition 1:
Assume that S1 > S0 > S−1 . We will provide conditions later on which guarantee that this condition
holds. For dg = 1 to be equilibrium outcome, we need that unilateral deviations by the union are
not profitable. Hence we need that π1 > π−1 which implies that

ucg

<

uIg −

cI − cC
S1 − S−1

(B.1)

Moreover, we need that and π1 > π−0 which implies

uC
g

<

uIg −

cI
S1 − S0

(B.2)

Note that equation (B.2) implies equation (B.1). Hence we have:

θC

<

I
T0−1 {u−1
g (ug −
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cI
)} ≡ K1 (θI )
S1 − S0

(B.3)

Similarly, for dg = −1 to be equilibrium outcomes, we need π−1 > π0 which implies

uC
g

>

uIg +

cC
S0 − S−1

(B.4)

as well as π−1 − π1 > 0, which implies as seen above:

uC
g

>

uIg +

cC − cI
S1 − S−1

(B.5)

Since equation (B.4) implies equation (B.5), we have:

cC
)} ≡ K2 (θI )
S0 − S−1

θC

>

I
T0−1 {u−1
g (ug +

S1

=

C
I
I
F (uIv − E[uC
v | θ < K1 (θ )] + a )

S0

=

C
I
I
F (uIv − E[uC
v | θ ∈ [K1 (θ ), K2 (θ )]])

(B.6)

Moreover, we have

S−1

(B.7)

C
I
C
= F (uIv − E[uC
v | θ > K2 (θ )] − a )

Thus K1 (θI ) and K2 (θI ) solves the system of equations:

cI
)}
C
− F (uIv − E[uC
−
|
< K1 ] +
v | θ ∈ [K1 , K2 ]])
cC
I
T0−1 {u−1
)}
g (ug +
I
C
C
C
C
F (uv − E[uv | θ ∈ [K1 , K2 ]]) − F (uIv − E[uC
v | θ > K2 ] − a )
I
T0−1 {u−1
g (ug −

F (uIv

E[uC
v

θC

aI )

= K1
= K2

Finally, S1 > S0 > S−1 requires that

C
I
C
C
I
I
E[uC
v | θ < K1 (θ )] − E[uv | θ ∈ [K1 (θ ), K2 (θ )]] <

aI

(B.8)

C
I
I
C
C
I
E[uC
v | θ ∈ [K1 (θ ), K2 (θ )]] − E[uv | θ > K2 (θ )] <

aC

(B.9)
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Q.E.D.

Proof of Proposition 2:
Given S1 > S0 > S−1 , there can be only one equilibrium as shown in equilibrium analysis. To
have other equilibrium, one of the following inequalities must be true: S0 > S−1 > S1 , S−1 > S1 >
S0 , S−1 > S0 > S1 , S1 > S−1 > S0 or S0 > S1 > S−1 . We will rule them out by contradictions.
Suppose at equilibrium, S0 > S1 > S−1 . Then, to have dg = 1 rather than dg = 0, π1 − π0 > 0 and
hence:

θC

>

I
T −1 {u−1
g (ug +

cI
)} ≡ K̂
S0 − S1

So the strategy must have the form

dg = 1 if θC ∈ (K̂, K̄]
dg = 0 if θC ∈ [K, K̂]

for some K, K̄ ∈ [0, 1].
If K̂ ≥ 1 or K̂ < 0, then this is trivially not an equilibrium with all three actions dg = {1, 0, −1}
arising in equilibrium outcomes.
If K̂ ∈ [0, 1), then the vote size would be

S1

C
I
= F (E[uIv − uC
v | θ ∈ (K̂, K̄]] + a )

S0

C
= F (E[uIv − uC
v | θ ∈ [K, K̂]])

and hence S1 > S0 which is a contradiction.
The other four cases (S0 > S−1 > S1 , S−1 > S1 > S0 , S−1 > S0 > S1 , S1 > S−1 > S0 ) can be
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ruled out by the same method. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3:
For the interior solution, by assumption S1 > S0 ,

K1

=

I
T0−1 {u−1
g (ug −

<

I
I
T0−1 {u−1
g (ug )} = θ

F (uIv

−

E[uC
v

|

θC

< K1 ] +

aI )

cI
)}
C
− F (uIv − E[uC
v | θ ∈ [K1 , K2 ]])
(B.10)

Similarly, by assumption S0 > S−1 ,

K2

cC
)}
C
I
C
C
C
F (uIv − E[uC
v | θ ∈ [K1 , K2 ]]) − F (uv − E[uv | θ > K2 ] − a )

=

I
T0−1 {u−1
g (ug +

>

I
I
T0−1 {u−1
g (ug )} = θ

(B.11)

Therefore, we have K1 < θI < K2 . Since dg = 1 if θC < K1 < θI , we have T0 (θC ) < T0 (θI ), and
thus if the challenger wins, ∆T < 0.
Similarly, because dg = −1 iff θC > K2 > θI , we have T0 (θC ) > T0 (θI ), and thus if the challenger
wins, ∆T > 0.
For the third case, since dg = 0 iff θC ∈ [K1 , K2 ], then T0 (θC ) ∈ [T0 (K1 ), T0 (K2 )], T0 (θC ) −
T0 (θI ) ∈ [T0 (K1 ) − T0 (θI ), T0 (K2 ) − T0 (θI )], define  = max{|T0 (K1 ) − T0 (θI )|, |T0 (K2 ) − T0 (θI )|},
we have | T0 (θC ) − T0 (θI ) |≤ .
Q.E.D.

B.2

Tables and Figures
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Figure B.1: Timeline and Game Predictions
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Figure B.2: The Optimal Strategy of the Union

The optimal strategy of the union is plotted in Figure 2. The two axes denote the type of the
incumbent and the type of the challenger. The lines in the plot denote the cut-off levels that
characterize the optimal strategy of the union. The 45 degree line satisfies θI = θC and falls
between the two cutoff values.
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Table B.1: Summary Statistics

96

Mean
SD
10%
90% Cities
Elections
Population
546197.22 909826.76 158137.51 867688.35
92
292
Public Sector Size/ Population
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.04
92
292
Payroll/Population
413.94
288.34
201.42
816.53
92
292
Police Size/Public Sector Size
16.61
5.70
8.50
22.99
92
292
Fire Size/Public Sector Size
11.02
3.78
6.09
16.21
91
290
Teacher Size/Public Sector Size
33.77
8.04
25.99
44.21
11
36
Police Payroll/Public Sector Payroll
20.64
6.97
11.02
28.40
92
292
Fire Payroll/Public Sector Payroll
13.92
4.82
7.64
20.53
91
290
Teacher Payroll/Public Sector Payroll
38.36
9.85
26.29
50.04
11
36
Turnout Rate in General Elections%
15.49
8.08
6.24
25.00
92
286
Turnout Rate in Runoff Elections%
21.77
8.67
12.61
33.49
31
59
Turnout Rate in Repub Primaries%
4.32
2.70
1.88
8.29
5
9
Turnout Rate in Dem Primaries%
13.70
6.69
3.63
20.86
10
24
Note: The table above provides summary statistics for the key variables in the data set. We report the mean,
the standard deviation, the 10th and the 90th percentile. We also report the number of cities and elections
for which we observe the variables.

Table B.2: Path Analysis
Endorse Incumbent Only
Marginal Victory 33.44
Obs
41

Endorse Nobody
Marginal Victory 39.99
Obs
200
Total
299
Endorse Challengers Only
Marginal Victory 16.47
Obs
44

Endorse Both
Marginal Victory 16.60
Obs
14

Incumbent
Wins
35
Challenger
Wins
6
Incumbent
Wins
181
Challenger
Wins
19
Incumbent
Wins
24
Challenger
Wins
20
Incumbent
Wins
7
Challenger
Wins
7

Note: This table reports the number of times the different strategies were played in my sample. It
illustrates the frequency of union endorsements and their impact on election outcomes in our
sample.
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Table B.3: Incumbent’s Probability of Winning
Dependent Variable: Incumbent Wins
Sector Police, Firefighter or Teacher Unions
Election Type
General
Runoff
Key Election
incumbent endorsed
-0.091
-0.094
-0.068
[0.067]
[0.147]
[0.064]
challenger endorsed -0.345***
-0.218
-0.401***
[0.065]
[0.175]
[0.074]
both endorsed -0.518*** -0.464**
-0.491***
[0.135]
[0.226]
[0.120]
City characteristics
YES
YES
YES
Obs
294
60
299
Note: This table reports results from logit regressions of incumbents’ win probabilities on
endorsements. We distinguish between general elections, run-off-elections and key elections. The
key election can be a primary, a general or a run-off election. We use the one with the highest
turn-out.

Table B.4: Endorsements and Incumbents’ Share

Sector
Election Type
incumbent endorsed
challenger endorsed
both endorsed
City characteristics
City and Year Dummies
Obs
R-Square

Dependent Variable: Incumbent Share
Police, Firefighter or Teacher Unions
General
Runoff
Key Election
-4.81
-3.90
-1.72
1.34
-2.80
-1.81
[3.13]
[5.20]
[5.41]
[8.55]
[2.91]
[4.85]
-22.42*** -23.31*** -8.90* -11.45 -22.17*** -23.36***
[2.92]
[3.86]
[5.15] [10.06]
[2.73]
[3.59]
-17.81*** -23.90***
-8.95
-5.20 -17.32*** -23.05***
[3.16]
[5.51]
[6.08] [19.76]
[2.48]
[4.98]
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
294
294
60
60
299
299
0.237
0.573
0.261
0.832
0.238
0.594

Note: The vote share of the incumbent provides an alternative measure of the electoral success of
the incumbent. We regress the vote share of the incumbent on union endorsement controlling for
observed and unobserved city characteristics. The results are summarized in the table above.
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Table B.5: Endorsement and Voter Turnout

Sector
Type
incumbent endorsed
challenger endorsed
both endorsed
City characteristics
City and Year Dummies
Obs

Dependent Variable: Turnout Rate
Police, Firefighter or Teacher Unions
Key General Runoff
Key General
2.77**
0.66
1.55
2.66**
0.83
[1.10]
[0.94]
[2.25]
[1.25]
[0.93]
4.89*** 3.63***
0.76 3.67***
1.83
[1.24]
[1.22]
[2.54]
[1.05]
[1.48]
9.45***
8.14**
5.24 7.19***
3.89
[3.22]
[3.26]
[4.29]
[1.60]
[2.55]
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
292
286
59
292
286

Runoff
3.69
[5.35]
4.14
[4.45]
2.34
[4.47]
YES
59

Note: A union can influence the outcome of a local election by mobilizing its base including union
members as well as friends and family of members. We regress election turnout on union
endorsement controlling for observed and unobserved city characteristics. The results are
summarized in the table above.
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Table B.6: Urban Fiscal Policies
Dependent Variables
Sector
Incumbent Loss * Challenger endorsed: t-1
Incumbent Loss * Challenger endorsed: t-2
Incumbent Loss * Challenger endorsed: t-3
Incumbent Loss * Challenger endorsed: t-4
City and Year Dummies
Obs
R-square

Size/Population
Total Police
Fire
0.51
1.47
4.12
[4.16]
[1.25] [3.34]
0.41
1.82
4.12
[3.44]
[1.28] [3.55]
5.03
2.24 1.39*
[3.92]
[1.67] [0.75]
8.209*
2.480 0.384
[4.65]
[1.73] [1.12]
YES
YES
YES
1,365
1,365 1,361
0.97
0.91
0.84

Payroll/Population
Total Police
Fire
8.39
2.91
8.86
[11.74]
[2.83]
[6.31]
13.45
2.17 10.94*
[10.37]
[3.07]
[6.03]
21.04*
3.12
3.95*
[12.07]
[3.89]
[2.29]
18.250
4.134
0.931
[14.05]
[3.72]
[3.68]
YES
YES
YES
1,365
1,365
1,361
0.97
0.88
0.83
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Note: This table reports results from regressions of fiscal policy variables interactions between endorsements and election outcomes to test
whether more union friendly politicians increase the share of transfers to union members.
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